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INTRODUCTION

Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (the Act) governs the regulation of hazardous air pollutants. l From 1970 to 1990, the statute
required the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to regulate hazardous air pollutants on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis. 2 Environmental policy analysts generally acknowledge
that this approach failed due to scientific uncertainties and unclear
direction from Congress on how the EPA should balance the competing concerns of cost and safety. In an effort to improve the
Act's effectiveness, Congress passed the 1990 Amendments (the
Amendments) to the Act,S which established a two-phased approach to regulation. First, subsection 112(d) requires the EPA to
promulgate technology-based emission standards for categories
and subcategories of industries that are major or area sources of
189 specified hazardous air pollutants. 4 Because Congress was concerned that these controls would not eliminate all emissions posing
unacceptable health risks to exposed populations, subsection
112(f) then requires the EPA to determine for each category or
subcategory of industries whether more stringent emission standards should be promulgated to control residual risks. 5
Given the previously slow pace of regulation, Congress was
probably right to emphasize speed and scope, rather than stringency and health, in requiring the EPA to promulgate national,
1. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(b)(I)(A)-(B) (1988).
3. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(I)-(2). The Amendments require that EPA set emissions
standards based on "measures, processes, methods, systems, or techniques" then available
for pollution reduction. [d. § 7412(d) (2).
5. Id. § 7412(f).
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uniform technology-based regulations for categories and subcategories of industries. The residual risk provisions in subsection
112 (f), however, provide only vague guidelines for the EPA to follow in establishing health-based standards after the technologybased approach is in place. In fact, the residual risk provisions
adopt essentially the same approach to health-based regulation
that failed in the pre-1990 version of the statute. Subsection 112(f)
requires the EPA to examine the cancer risk of individual facilities
in determining whether the agency must promulgate residual risk
standards, but then requires the agency to issue such standards for
a category or subcategory of industry rather than for the individual
facilities. 6
This Article proposes establishing an "exceptions process" to
exempt individual facilities from both the categorical technologybased standards in subsection 112(d) and the residual risk standards in subsection 112 (f). Under this approach, a firm could apply for a variance from either type of standard following a sitespecific risk assessment that demonstrates that (a) the costs of the
standard are disproportionate to the benefits, and that (b) there is
not an unacceptable risk to surrounding residents. At the same
time, this approach would enable citizens to request a more stringent standard for an individual facility upon proof that the existing
standards inadequately control the health risks presented by the
facility.
On the one hand, an individualized approach would more effectively regulate hazardous air pollutants. The current residual
risk regulations provide insufficient protection in several important
areas. Subsection 112(f) fails to address the risks of excessive concentrations of certain pollutants (hot-spots), our inability to compare carcinogens and non-carcinogens, indirect and multimedia
impacts, and potentially disparate impacts on diverse exposed subpopulations.7 While more stringent national standards might be
6. See id. § 7412(f) (2).
7. Scientists are beginning to chart genetic differences in human cancer susceptibj}.
ity. See Alon Rosenthal et al .• Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure 10 Toxic Chrnticals, 19 ECOLOGYLQ. 269. 289 n.l04 (1992). However. e\'en \\;thoutscientific C\;dence of
genetic cancer-risk differences. occupational exposure to airborne carcinogens increases
cancer risks for groups such as farmworkers and pesticide applicators.
In addition. the EPA has recently targeted the issue of environmentlljustice in light of
evidence that facilities emitting airborne toxics are more likely to be found in minority.
than in white neighborhoods even when income differences are taken into accounL Ste
Stephen c.jones, EPA Targets 'EnvironmenlalRacism~ NAT'L LJ•• Aug. 9,1993, at 28, 34, 36.
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helpful in addressing some of these issues, many of these problems
are essentially local in nature and require site-specific solutions.
On the other hand, industry often argues that technology-based
regulation frequently imposes requirements that are unnecessary
and inefficient at specific facilities. s Other pollution control statutes contain some limited exceptions for certain categories of polluters.9 In contrast, the Clean Air Act provides no variance
procedure from subsection 112(d)'s technology-based emission
standards for sources of hazardous air pollutants. Moreover, the
residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) do not provide any exemptions for industry, even where the technology-based emission
standards for a category of sources exceeds the level necessary to
achieve subsection 112 (f) 's health-based standards at a particular
source.
Even if the reader agrees that subsection 112(f) suffers from
both over- and under-regulation, the difficult question of how to
implement a better approach remains. Commentators disagree
about whether exceptions from national, uniform environmental
standards promote efficiency or simply encourage political manipulation. 1o The use of an exceptions process for sources of toxic
pollutants is likely to be especially controversial, but both fairness
and efficiency arguments support establishing a variance process
for sources of air toxics. Because any exceptions process includes a
risk of abuse,11 policymakers should encourage public participation to protect against biased decisionmaking.
While Congress could simply allow the EPA to grant exceptions
on an ad hoc basis, congressional standards regarding appropriate
exceptions would more readily achieve public approval. Two contradictory yet related issues must be addressed. On the one hand,
a statute must provide sufficient guidance to the EPA regarding the
appropriate level of stringency for regulating specific hazardous air
pollutants. On the other hand, there is insufficient information
8. See generally AMoco/U.S. E.P.A., YORKTOWN POLLUTION PREVENTION PROJECT, PRO.
JECT SUMMARY (1992) [hereinafter AMoco]. Industry has suggested site-specific controls as
a way to reduce uniform national requirements. Industry Cemvinces EPA to Seek Comment on
Plan for Site-Specific Benzene Cemtrois, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1911 (Nov. 27, 1992).
9. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (k) (1988) (innovative technology variance for two years);
Id. § 131l(n) (fundamentally different factors variance).
10. See infra notes 236-50 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 75-81 (1980) (criticizing variances as potential tool of political influence); Howard Latin, Ideal Vmus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementatiem of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1316 (1985) [hereinafter Latin, "Fine-Tuning1.
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about many risks, and pollutant risks are often difficult, if not impossible, to compare.
The EPA needs significant discretion in order to exercise its
technical expertise to address complicated risks. The EPA, however, also needs clearer congressional guidance to provide the
agency vnth greater legitimacy and a better understanding of public priorities. This Article therefore proposes a "fuzzy bright line"
statute that combines significant delegation to the EPA with flexible, but clear, standards. This proposal represents a compromise
between those favoring congressional micromanagement of the
EPA, and those wishing to delegate most decisions to the agency's
expertise. In particular, this Article disagrees with the argument
that the priority-setting and screening approach in section 112 (f)
will lead to more effective pollution control than legislating
residual risk standards. 12
The "fuzzy bright line" approach proposed in this Article may
be the best legislative approach. Given the serious criticisms this
Article raises concerning the inaccuracies of risk assessment, however, the "fuzzy bright line" approach may appear irresponsible.
One possible solution to this problem is to promote increased public participation in policy-making at the local level.
II.

REsIDUAL RISK AND THE

1990 AMENDMENTS

Subsection A will discuss the original version of section 112,
which regulated hazardous air pollutants on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis, and will describe how the 1990 Amendments shifted the
regulatory focus from individual pollutants to sources of hazardous
air pollutants. This subsection closely examines the limitations of
the residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) (2)(A) of the
amended Act.
A

The Original Clean Air Act and the 1990 Amendments

1. Pre-1990 Regulation of Air Toxies.

Section 112 of the 1970 Clean Air Act required the EPA to set
health-based emission standards, rather than technology-based
standards, for hazardous air pollutants. Congress intended these
standards to provide "an ample margin of safety to protect the pub12. See, e.g., Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 275-76 (bright lines may undennine
scientific progress), 323-27 (discussing bright lines for "screening" and "priority setting"),
344, 360-61 (bright lines create inefficiency).
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lic health" from that air pollutant. 13 Because "most hazardous air
pollutants ... are non threshold pollutants, for which scientists cannot determine a no-observed-effect level of exposure,"14 the only
absolutely safe level of emissions is zero. Yet the ambiguous "ample
margin of safety" language does not guide the agency to standards
that are absolutely safe. 15 Nor does it clarify whether EPA may consider technological constraints or economic considerations in crafting an emissions standard. 16 The "ample margin of safety"
language proved counterproductive because the EPA was reluctant
to effectively shut down entire industries by listing pollutants,
where such listing would require zero emission standards. 17 This
proved especially true when the costs of industry shutdowns were
far greater than the benefits from pollutant regulation. IS As a result, between 1970 and 1988 the agency listed only eight hazardous
air pollutants and promulgated standards for only some sources of
seven types of hazardous air pollutants. 19
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(I)(B).
14. Janet L McQuaid, Note, Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under the EPA :s
Final Benzene Rules and tile CleanAiT Act Amendments of 1990,70 TEX. L. REv. 427, 430 (1991);
see NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1153 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) ("With the exception
of mercury, every pollutant the Administrator has listed or intends to list under § 112 is a
non·threshold carcinogen."); William A. Wichers et aI., Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under tile New Clean Air Act: Technology-Based Standards at Last, 22 EnvtI. L. Rep. (EnvtI.
L Inst.) 10,717, 10,718 (1992).
15. See Wichers et a1., supra note 14, at 10,718; McQuaid, supra note 14, at 430-31.
The st,ltUtOry phrase "ample margin of safety" suggested that an emission standard be set
at a very protective level because of the difference between this standard and the standard
in § 109(b)(l) setting primary ambient air quality standards based "on an adequate margin
of safety." Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1) (B) (1970) ("ample margin of safety") tvith 42
U.S.C. § 7409 (b) (1) (1988) (emphasis supplied). See Khristine L. Hall, The Control of Toxic
Pollutants Under tile Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L. REv.
609, 629-30 (1978) (referencing CAA § 112, and comparing the meaning of an "ample"
versus an "adequate" margin of safety); Wichers et. a1., supra note 14, at 10,718 n.12.
16. The most likely explanation for § 112's ambiguity is that, to the extent Congress
actually considered the implications of its "ample margin of safety" language, it deliberately excluded cost and feasibility as factors for EPA to consider in setting emissions standards. SeeJohn P. Dwyer, Tile Pathology oJSymbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 237-41
(1990); see also Wichers et aI., supra note 14, at 10,718.
17. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 255; McQuaid, supra note 14, at 431.
18. See Clean Air Act (Part 2): Hearings before tile Subcomm. on Health and Environment of
tile House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 737 (1981) (statement of
WaIter C. Barber, Jr., Director, Office of Quality Planning and Standards, EPA, "[T]he
Agency has been reluctant to list chemicals without some assurance that adverse effects
could actually occur and can be prevented by control strategies."); Dwyer, supra note 16, at
260; Wichers et a1., supra note 14, at 10,718.
19. See Dwyer. supra note 16, at 252, 261-62, 267-69; Wichers et al., supra note 14, at
10,718-19; Gary E. Marchant & Dawn P. Danzeisen, Comment, "Acceptable" Risk for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 HARv. ENVIL. L. REv. 535, 536-37 (1989); McQuaid, supra note 14, at
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Some commentators argue that the old section 112 was bound
to fail because Congress intentionally created a program that was
"more symbolic than functional. "20 The Act failed to address the
administrative and political constraints that would prevent the EPA
from implementing the statutory provisions.21 Thus, the combination of insufficient information and overly strict regulation
doomed the original emissions reduction program.22
Following the Clean Air Act's enactment in 1970, the EPA gradually developed a nvo-fold strategy to address the problems created
by the "ample margin of safety" criterion. First, the EPA delayed
listing pollutants. Second, the EPA construed the language of section 112 to permit consideration of economic and technological
factors when developing emission standards.23 Environmentalists
strongly opposed the EPA's interpretation, claiming that the origi431. In part, the EPA did not wish to list a substance and to promulgate emission standards until the agency had compiled sophisticated studies that could "ithstand litigation
from regulated industries. However, this quest for greater certainty made it difficult, if not
impossible for the EPA to meet the six-month deadlines for proposing and promulgating
emission standards following listing. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 237-39; Wichers et aI.,
supra note 14, at 10,718-19.
20. Dwyer, supra note 16, at 233.
21. See id. & passim. Professor Dwyer has argued that the legislators who enacted the
old § 112 reaped political benefits from voting for "an ample margin of safety- and left the
EPA and the courts with the unpalatable task of balancing health against jobs. Id. at 24649; Kevin J. Worthen, The Last Shall Be FITSt, and the First Last: Ruminalions on the Past, Presml
and Future Course of Government Regulation ofHazardous Pollulants, 1989 B.Y.U. L REv. 1113,
1142 (discussing symbolic nature of statutes that do not consider cost of regulation); ge
also McQuaid, supra note 14, at 432-33.
22. Some commentators target the lack of sufficient information as explaining the
failure of health-based regulation. See generally Latin, ·Fi~Tuning.· supra note 11, at 132831; see alsoJohn S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, InJannalion, and Rrgulalory Slrudure in
Toxic Substances C0ntr04 9 YALEJ. ON REG. 277, 282 n.15 (1992) [hereinafter Applegate,
Worst Things] ("[TJhe precise effects of toxic substances on human health and the emironment cannot be stated with any certainty."). Others explain the under-regulation of hazardous air pollutants and other toxies by the EPA as the paradox of O\'Cr-regulation-that
excessive stringency results in under-regulation because regulators are un\\illing to impose
irrationally tight controls. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFr£R ntE RIeHTS REv0WT10N: REcoNCElVING ntE REGUlATORY STATE 91-92, 106-07 (l990);joHN MENDELOFF, R.EcULATlNC SAFEn,: AN
ECONOMIC AND POUTICAL ANAL'\'SIS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFEtY AND HEALTH Poucv (1979).
23. Dwyer, supra note 16, at 235,251-52. While the EPA was initially hesitant to admit
that it was relying on economic and technological factors in issuing standards, the agency
was more forthright about its use of economic factors in the proposed and final emission
standards for vinyl chloride. 1d. at 252-53; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants; Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560 (1976) [hereinafter Standard
for Vinyl Chloride]; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Proposed
Standard for Vmyl Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532 (1975) [hereinafter Proposed Standard
for Vinyl Chloride].
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nal section 112 required a zero-risk approach. 24 Nevertheless, the
EPA's apparently less stringent technology-based approach may
have been more effective than the symbolic (but unworkable) "ample margin of safety" standard. 25
In a unanimous en banc decision, the D.C. Circuit in Vinyl Chloride,26 struck down the EPA's attempt to apply a technology-based
policy to section 112. That court also rejected, however, the Natural Resources Defense Council's argument that the agency should
focus only on health considerations when setting emission standards for air toxieS. 27 The Vinyl Chloride court required the EPA to
undertake a two-step procedure for setting emissions standards for
hazardous air pollutants. First, the agency must determine what
constitutes an "acceptable risk to health" based exclusively on
health considerations. The court emphasized that while it did not
equate "safe" with "risk-free" or even free from uncertainty, "the
Administrator cannot under any circumstances consider cost and
technological feasibility at this stage of the analysis. "28 Second, the
EPA has the discretion to set a stricter emission standard to provide
an ample margin of safety. In taking such action the agency may
consider the limitations of scientific knowledge, as well as costs and
technological feasibility.29 In the wake of Vinyl Chloride, the EPA
promulgated final emissions standards for several benzene and ra24. SeeJohn D. Graham, The Failure ofAgency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carci1lCJo
gens Under Section 112 of the C/eanAirAct, 35 DUKE LJ. 100, 131 (1985); Wichers et aI., supra
note 14, at 10,719.
25. See Latin, "Fine-Tuning," supra note 11, at 1309 ("In sum, the original harm-based
approach for regulation of toxic water pollutants proved ineffective and has largely been
replaced by technology-based standards that are more easily implemented. Experience
with regulation of hazardous air pollutants has been quite similar."); see also Sanford E.
Gaines, Science, Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks Through Law, 30 jURIMETRICSj. 271,
300 (1990) ("Technology-based standards have many theoretical advantages over the nominally pure health-based approach now embodied in section 112.").
26. NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
27. The court acknowledged its obligation to defer to the EPA's reasonable interpretation of a statute. The court concluded, however, that in applying the technology-based
formulation set out in the vinyl chloride emission standards, the EPA administrator had
not "exercised his expertise to determine an acceptable risk to health" but had "substituted
technological feasibility for health as the primary consideration under Section 112." ld. at
1163; see also Chevron, U.S.A. V. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984) (courts must defer to
agency's construction of statute if statute is ambiguous and agency's construction is
reasonable) .
28. NRDC V. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1165.
29. Id. at 1164-66. The court's analysis is confusing because the decision excludes
nonhealth factors from the determination of what constitutes acceptable risk, but includes
them for judging whether a standard provides the requisite "ample margin of safety." See
Gaines, supra note 25, at 293-94.
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dionuclide categories. Notably, the agency employed an historical
risk survey to set a "presumptive level" of acceptability for the maximum individual cancer risk at one-in-10,OOO.5o

2.

1990 Amendments.

The controversy over the Act's health-based "ample margin of
safety" language and the agency's delay in issuing emission standards for individual pollutants based on that language led Congress to overhaul section 112 of the Act in the 1990 Amendments.
Under the current version of the statute, regulation of hazardous
air pollutants will take place in two stages.
First, the EPA must promulgate uniform, national technologybased31 emission standards for categories or subcategories of major
sources32 and area sources53 of hazardous air pollutants.54 Congress specified 189 substances that are to be considered "hazardous
air pollutants" for purposes of the Act55 In the second phase of
regulation, the EPA is required to promulgate more stringent emissions standards for those categories of sources for which the technology-based standards have proven to be insufficiently protective
of human health or the environment36 An important question is
what type of criteria should the EPA employ to determine whether
technology-based emission standards are sufficiently protective.
3.

Residual Risk Provisions.

One possible objection to this Article's proposal is that it is premature to discuss how to improve the residual risk provisions until
the National Academy of Sciences, the Risk Assessment and Management Commission, and the EPA have had an opportunity to
prepare reports on the agency's risk assessment methods relating
30. NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1164-66. Bul S£l McQuaid. supra note 14. at 437 (criticizing use of historical survey data as inappropriate guide for setting current standards).
31. In a technology-based system of regulation. an agency sets standards based not on
the health effects of pollutants, but on the pollution-control capabilities of technology.
John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: fnJormaIum, &gvlalO7J Poli9, and Toxic
Substances Conlro~ 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 261, 268 n.28 (1991) [hereinafter Applegate, Perils].
32. A major source is one that emits either ten tons per year of any single air toxic or
twenty-five tons per year of any combination of air toxies. 42 U.s.c. § 7412(a)(I).
33. An area source is defined as "any stationary source ••• that is not a major source.fd. § 7412(a) (2). Dry cleaners fall into this category.
34. fd. § 7412(d).
35. fd. § 7412(b). Congress' list includes the eight hazardous air pollutants identified
by the EPA prior to 1989. fd.
36. [d. § 7412{f).
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to hazardous air pollutants. The very questions that section 112
requires that these reports address, however, suggest that an exceptions process is necessary to address a number of complex risk issues at individual sites, although these reports will undoubtedly
raise technical issues beyond the scope of those discussed in this
Article. This Article's prediction that the residual risk regulations
will inadequately address noncancer effects is already being borne
out by the Academy's draft report, issued on January 19, 1994,
which was unable to provide a full evaluation of such impacts because of time constraints. It is important to understand what issues
Congress wanted these reports to address and why any nationally
uniform residual risk regulations are unlikely to address the concerns raised by this Article.
a.

EPA's Report.

By November 15, 1996, after consulting with the Surgeon General and providing opportunity for public comment, the EPA must
report to Congress on: (1) methods for measuring the residual
risks remaining after application of the technology-based emission
standards; (2) the public health impact of such remaining risks
and the costs associated with any "technologically and commercially available" methods of reducing such risks; (3) the actual
health effects caused by these residual emissions with respect to
persons living in the vicinity of such emissions, in light of any uncertainties in risk assessment methodology; and (4) the agency's
recommendations for addressing the remaining risks. 37
b.

National Academy of Sciences' Report.

To address the policy questions surrounding the issues of
residual risk, Congress ordered the National Academy of Sciences
to conduct an independent study of the EPA's risk assessment
methods relating to hazardous air pollutants. Subsection
112(0) (1) requires the EPA and the Academy to enter into an
agreement to conduct a review of the agency's present risk assessment methodology for carcinogens and to recommend improvements. 3S Specifically, Congress requested that the Academy
consider the techniques used for "estimating and describing the
carcinogenic potency to humans of hazardous air pollutants" and
for estimating the exposure of various individuals, including "hypo37. Id. § 7412(f) (1).
38. Id. § 7412(0)(1).
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thetical and actual maximally exposed individuals," to hazardous
air pollutants.39 In addition, Congress mandated that the Academy
evaluate" [t] 0 the extent practicable" the methodology for assessing
the risk of "adverse human health effects other than cancer for
which safe thresholds of exposure may not exist, including, but not
limited to, inheritable genetic mutations, birth defects, and reproductive dysfunctions. "40 The Academy is to submit its report to the
relevant Senate and House committees, the EPA, and the Risk Assessment and Management Commission (the Commission) established by section 303 of the Amendments:n
OnJanuary 19, 1994, the Academy's Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants issued a draft report pursuant to
subsection 112 (0), entitled Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment.42
The report calls on the EPA to express more emphasis on uncertainties in the agency's risk assessments, and to devote more attention to chemical risks when there are multiple routes of exposure,
multiple chemicals, and multiple possible adverse health effects.4s
Members of the Executive Committee of the agency's Science Advisory Board have criticized the Academy report for failing to evaluate noncancer effects because of time limitations.44 These
members argued that the Academy or EPA should examine immunological, respiratory, reproductive, and neurological problems.45
Richard Thomas, director of toxicology and risk assessment at the
Academy, vnil soon begin a project to look at reproductive and developmental risk assessment.46
The limited scope of the Academy's report suggests the difficulties that the EPA 'will have in developing national uniform residual
risk emission standards for risks other than cancer. An exceptions
process would provide the agency with the flexibility to impose ad39. Id. § 7412{o) (2).
40. Id. § 7412{o) (3). This last provision regarding non cancer health effects is notable because, as will be discussed below, § 112(f) (2){A)'s residual risk pro\isions are
mandatory only with respect to cancer risks.
41. Id. § 7412{o)(4).
42. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ScIENCE AND JUDCMENT IN RIsK Ass£S&IEh'T

(Draft 1994); Toxic Substances: Report Backs EPA Risk As.smment Mtlhods, Offm 70 Suggestions
for Improvements, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1699 aan. 28, 1994) [hereinafter &port Badts EPA).
43. Report Backs EPA, supra note 42, at 1699.
44. Air PoUulion: Report on the HealJh Effects of Toxic PoUutants Should Address Non-amccr
Problems, SAB Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1720 (Feb. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Non<ancCT
Problems].
45. Id.
46. Id.
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ditional requirements at individual sites where noncancer effects
are especially worrisome.
Prior to the promulgation of any residual risk standard under
subsection 112(f), the EPA must consider, but need not adopt, the
Academy's recommendations. In addition, the Administrator must
publish revised Guidelines for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment or a
detailed explanation of the reasons why any recommendation in
the Academy's report will not be implemented. 47
c.

Risk Assessment and Management Commission Report.

Subsection 303(a) of the Amendments established the Commission and assigned it the task of making a "full investigation of the
policy implications and appropriate uses of risk assessment and risk
management in regulatory programs under various federal laws to
prevent cancer and other chronic human health effects which may
result from exposure to hazardous substances. "48 Many of the factors that Congress required the Commission to consider, such as
noncancer chronic health effects, the "existence of synergistic or
antagonistic effects among hazardous substances," the "existence
of unquantified direct or indirect effects on human health in risk
assessment studies," and the "use of site-specific actual exposure
information in setting emission standards," were ignored in the
agency's pre-1990 regulation of hazardous air pollutants. 49
d.

Residual Risk Standards.

If Congress does not enact new legislation based on scientific
reports of the adequacy of risk assessment, then the Administrator
must determine for each category or subcategory whether addi47. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(0)(7). The publication of such revised Guidelines shall be con·
sidered a final agency action for purposes of judicial review pursuant to § 307 of the Act.
fd.
48. fd. § 7412. Section 303 of the Amendments, which is referred to in § 112(0)(4)
of the Act, is set out as a note to § 112. fd. § 7412 (Historical and Statutory Notes).
49. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 303, 104 Stat. 2399,
2575. Subsection 303(b)(l) mandates that the Commission consider the Academy report
in evaluating the use and limitations of risk assessment in establishing emission or effiuent
standards for hazardous substances that present a risk of carcinogenic effects or other
chronic health effects. Subsection 303(b) (2) requires the Commission to consider the
most appropriate methods for measuring and describing cancer risks or risks of other
chronic health effects from hazardous substances considering various factors including
"such alternative approaches as the lifetime risk of cancer or other effects to the individual
or individuals most exposed to emissions from a source or sources on both an actual and
worst case basis."
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tional, more stringent residual risk requirements are needed to
provide "an ample margin of safety to protect public health" or to
protect against "an adverse environmental effect"so Senate bills
816 and 1630 each would have required the EPA to promulgate
emission standards eliminating lifetime cancer risks to the most exposed individual greater than one-in-a-million.51 In addition, both
bills would have required the agency to close facilities that could
not meet an interim one-in-10,000 standard for reducing all lifetime cancer risk. This one-in-10,OOO standard allowed for limited
extensions but no exceptions.52 The final version of the Amendments incorporated a one-in-one-million standard as the threshold
for triggering further regulatory consideration and eliminated the
mandatory one-in-10,OOO standard.53
With regard to carcinogens, Section 112 (f) (2) (A) specifically
defines the crucial phrase, "an ample margin of safety to protect
the public health," to require the Administrator to promulgate a
second phase of emission standards if technology-based controls
do not reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the most exposed individual to less than one-in-one-million.54 The technology-based
emission standards for each source category or subcategory are
simple, uniform, national regulation. However, the residual risk
provisions require the EPA to consider each category or subcategory in light of a site-specific exposure assessment of the cancer
risk at each individual major source. The EPA must then promulgate residual risk standards for categories and subcategories of
50. 42 u.s.c. § 7412(f) (2) (A). The residual risk standard apparently must be at least
as protective of the most exposed individual as the EPA's post-VinJI Chltnide policy, since
the statute references the pre-1990 "ample margin of safety" definition. Id.
5!. Senate Bill 816 stated this standard as "a standard which eliminates a1llifetime
risks of carcinogenic effects greater than one in one million to the individual in the population who is most exposed to emissions of a pollutant (or stream of pollutants) from a
source in the category or subcategory." S. 816, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989) (proposed
amendment to CAA § 112(f) (1»; Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 323-24. Senate Bill 1630
adopted essentially the same test. See S. REP. No. 228, 10lst Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.GAN. 3385, 3533 (discussing Section 301 of S. 1630, which retained the two-tiered one-in-a-million and one-in-IO,OOO approaches).
52. See S. 816, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989) (proposed Amendment to CAA
§§ 112(f) (1){A)(i)(1)-(2); S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1989), rtprinltd in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3533 (discussing interim one-in-10,OOO standard).
53. See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f) (2) (A); Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 326.
54. See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f) (2) (A); see also 136 CoNG. RE.c. S16,928 (dailyed. Oct. 27,
1990) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) (combined hazardous emissions ofan entire major
source are used in determining ample margin of safety); id. at £3711 (daily ed. No\·. 2,
1990) (extension of remarks by Sen. Rowland) (ample margin of safety at least as protective as benzene regulations).
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sources, however, rather than individual facilities. 55 The text of the
statute does not require that the residual risk standard for a category be set at a level that would force the highest risk source in that
category to achieve the one-in-one-million benchmark, but merely
mandates an additional round of regulation.56 The statute, however, does not specify what risk requirements the agency must use
in the second phase of standards, nor do the provisions provide
any guidance on how to address risks from noncarcinogenic
substances.
Subsection 112(f) (2)(b) states that the amended section 112
does not repudiate the EPA's pre-1990 interpretation of "an ample
margin of safety" contained in the benzene rulemaking. 57 In the
benzene rulemaking, the EPA did not apply a one-in-one-million
standard to the maximally exposed individual, but instead determined that a one-in-ten-thousand risk to the maximally exposed
individual from a particular chemical was presumptively acceptable.58 The agency also stated that as many people as possible
should be protected from a one-in-one-million risk. 59 In addition,
the agency would look at other health and risk factors. 6o
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2).
56. See id § 7412(f) (2)(A); Wichers et aI., supra note 14, at 10,729.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2) (B). In the wake of Vinyl Chloride, the EPA issued final
emission standards for several benzene and radionuclide categories, and, most notably,
used a historical risk survey to set the "presumptive level" of maximum acceptable individual risk at one-in-l0,000. See National Emission Standards for Haz.'udous Air Pollut.mts
(NESHAP); Benzene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethyl Benzene Styrene
Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels, Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Product Recovery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,04546 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Benzene Standards]
(describing how EPA selected its method for setting emission standards for benzene and
radionuclide categories) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.270-.277, .110-.112, .130-.139 (1991).
58. See 1989 Benzene Standards, supra note 57, at 38,044-46 (establishing one in ten
thousand presumptive risk level); NESHAP; Benzene Emissions From Chemical Manufacturing Process Vents, Industrial Solvent Use, Benzene Waste Operations, Benzene Transfer
Operations, and Gasoline Marketing System, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,083, 38,089, 38,091 (1989)
[hereinafter Proposed Benzene Emissions Rule] (applying one-in-IO,OOO presumptive standard to certain sources of benzene emissions and benzene transfer operations); Rosenthal
et aI., supra note 7, at 304.
59. See Proposed Benzene Emissions Rule, supra note 58, at 38,091 ("The majority of
the people (greater than 99.9 percent) exposed to benzene emissions from this category
would be exposed to risk levels lower than [one-in-one-million]."); Rosenthal et aI., supra
note 7, at 304.
60. These factors include: (1) the overall incidence of cancer or other serious health
effects within the exposed population, (2) the number of persons exposed within each
individual lifetime range (such as a 50-kilometer exposure radius around the emitting facilities), (3) the science and policy assumptions and estimation uncertainties associated with
the risk measures, (4) the weight of the scientific evidence for human health effects, (5)
other quantified or unquantified health effects, and (6) the effects resulting from co-Ioca-
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Critics of the benzene rulemaking have argued that it allows the
EPA to retain consideration of economic and technological factors
while nominally complying "with Vinyl Chloride's two-pronged test. 51
In setting a particular "ample margin of safety," the EPA stated that
it would seek to set a lifetime cancer risk level for hazardous air
emissions at no greater than one-in-one-million, but noted that additional factors such as technological feasibility and the economic
costs of control would be considered.52
By not requiring a one-in-a-million or any other residual risk
standard in section 112 (f), Congress essentially left the difficult
task of defining an "ample margin of safety" to the EPA's discretion. 63 Furthermore, the Senate Bill does not provide any direction on how the agency should address harmful noncarcinogens. 61
This Article's proposal would require Congress to provide more
specific guidance to the EPA on residual risk standards.
B.

Risk, Hot Spots, Environmental Justice, and Multimedia Pollution

1.

Factual Backdrop.

There are significant problems with the residual risk provisions
for hazardous air pollutants. There is considerable scientific uncertainty about the actual risks of most hazardous air pollutants,
and great disagreements ensue about how to assess what little we
know about risk. Thus, a single risk standard on a single scale
poses problems. For example, the one-in-one-million standard in
subsection 112(f) is misleading; a risk range more accurately reflects our uncertainties about risk. In addition, it is important to
consider noncancer risks and to recognize the absence of good
measures for comparing chemicals that cause fundamentally different diseases. Society's uncertainty about the risks that many chemicals pose exacerbates the difficult problems of preventing "hotspots" and multimedia pollution.
Even setting aside the pervasive uncertainties about the risks of
many hazardous chemicals, industry arguments that national, unition of facilities and co--emission of pollutants. 1989 Benzene Standards, supra note 57, at
38,045-46.
61. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 276; McQuaid, supra note 14, at 439, 446. But if.
Gaines, supra note 25, at 295 ("The proposals and final rules that EPA has published since
the Vinyl Chloride decision show no signs of procedural subversion, but they do reveal the
tortured nature of a health-factors-only analysis.").
62. See 1989 Benzene Standards, supra note 57, at 38,046.
63. See 'Wichers et al., supra note 14, at 10,729.
64.. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying texL
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form regulation is inefficient because it results in over-regulation at
some sites have merit. The difficulty lies in allowing some flexibility for individual sites without undermining national standards and
pollution-reduction goals. Public participation can reduce the potential dangers of allowing exceptions to technology-based or
residual risk standards for air toxics.
a.

Scientific Uncertainty

There are two major questions that need to be addressed in
assessing the residual risk provisions and the proposal in this Article. First, can we properly assess the risk of cancer and other diseases caused by toxic chemicals?65 Second, is our inability to assess
the risk of cancer and other diseases fatal to the proposal or the
residual risk provisions, or is the uncertainty of this risk assessment
of the same magnitude as for all toxic pollution?66
There is considerable scientific uncertainty about most toxic
chemicals. 67 Unfortunately, for non-threshold chemicals at the
lowest levels of risk,68 there is no accurate method of risk quantification. 69 Former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus popular65. See generaUy Gaines, supra note 25, at 272-90 (discussing scientific, political and
legal uncertainties of risk assessment).
66. Because risk assessment involves predicting future events, there will always be an
element of uncertainty. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking The Wrong Questions in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 328 (1991) (suggesting a sliding-scale standard of proof that would base the stringency of regulatory
restrictions on the amount of evidence that a substance "causes" a risk of harm). Because
of our relative uncertainty about the risk of most toxic chemicals, this Article suggests that
the extent of public participation in permit decisions should depend on the riskiness of
the trade-off.
67. There is scientific uncertainty in part because scientific information about the
toxic effects of many toxic substances is relatively scarce.
68. The distinction between regulation of risk and regulation of harm, and therefore
the unreasonable risk standard, exists because of the difficulties in proving actual harm in
toxic torts cases. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 31, at 267-73. "Risk is an expression of
uncertainty; it is easier to prove than actual harm. Regulation based on risk permits regulatory action based on ex ante collective danger rather than ex post individual injury, and
also operates preventively to avert injury to the public as a whole." Id. at 273. Congress has
used the term "unreasonable risk" in slightly different ways in several different environmental statutes, each with its own regulatory structure, but all basically adopt "an undefined, nonzero level of risk determined on an ad hoc basis by balancing both health
considerations and nonhealth concerns such as technology, feasibility, and cost." Id. at 268,
267-77; see Applegate, Worst Things, supra note 22, at 284-85; Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7,
at 305 (the TSCA and FIFRA statutes both use unreasonable risk standards, but their risk
assessment practices are considerably different). Risk-based standards generally either
openly or secretly look at technological and economic feasibility as well. See Applegate,
Perils, supra note 31, at 268.
69. See generaUy Gary P. Rosenblum & Steven Lapp, The Use of Risk Index Systems to

HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 278 1994

1994]

HAZARDOUS AIR POUUTANTS

279

ized the distinction benveen "risk assessment"-the use of scientific
research to define the likelihood of harm as a result of exposure to
a substance or situation, and "risk management"-the process of
deciding a course of action upon determination of risk.70 Following the recommendations of a 1983 report of the National Research Council,71 the EPA divides risk assessment into four stages:
(1) hazard identification;72 (2) dose-response assessment;73 (3) exposure assessment;74 and (4) risk characterization.75 Despite the
Evaluate Risk, in

RISK AssESSMENT IN NATIONAL PRiORfIY SETIlNG 190, 19()'93 Games J.
Bonin & Donald E. Stevensen, eds., 1989); Applegate, nmt Things, supra note 22, at 325
n.252. Some have suggested that society may never have precise knowledge that below a
particular threshold of exposure a carcinogen may be safe, although it is ob\iously difficult
to predict the limits of future scientific advances. In NRDC v. EPA. 824 F.2d 1146, 1165
(D.C. Gir. 1987) (en bane) (Vinyl Chloride),Judge Bork stated that Congress in § 112 of the
Clean Air Act had recognized that the "determination of what is 'safe' \\ill ahJ:ays be
marked by scientific uncertainty and thus exhorted the Administrator to set emission standards that will provide an 'ample margin' of safety." Id.
70. William Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 Envtl. 1.. Rep. (Envtl. 1.. Inst.) 10,190
(1984); see Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 27()'71.
71. See generally NATIONAL REsEARCH CoUNCIL, RIsK AssESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GovERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983); Rosenthal et al.• supra note 7. at 279-95; Mary
Jean Sawey et al., Notes from the Field: The Potential Heahh Bentjils oJ ConlToUing Hazardous Air
Pollutants, 1 VII.L. ENVIL. 1..J. 473, 479 (1990).
72. Hazard identification involves a study of the weight of scientific evidence to determine whether or not a chemical or mixture poses a risk of adverse health effects to human
beings. See Guidelines for Carcinogenic Risk Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992. 33.99434,000 [hereinafter EPA Guidelines]; Rosenthal et al•• supra note 7. at 279-85.
73. Dose-response assessment involves a study of the quantitative relationship between the amount of exposure to a chemical and the incidence or se\'Crity of resulting
illness. It often involves extrapolating from evidence of cancer in animals from high exposures in the laboratory to lower doses to which humans are exposed in the environment.
See Rosenthal et al.• supra note 7. at 285-90.
74. Exposure assessment involves a study of the number of people exposed to the
chemical and their exposure profiles in terms of concentration. frequency, and duration.
See EPA Guidelines. supra note 72, at 33.998; Guidelines for Exposure Assessment. 57 Fed.
Reg. 22888 (1992) [hereinafter Exposure Assessment]; Rosenthal etal.• supra note 7, at 29093. A distinction needs to be made between risk assessments that examine the general
health impacts of a chemical and site-specific exposure assessments that examine the hypothetical or actual impacts of a particular source's emissions on the surrounding population. Even if our generalized knowledge concerning a chemical is limited. it is still possible
to acquire additional information about the impact from that chemical at a specific source.
The use of site-specific exposure assessments is not intended to replace the need for additional testing of chemicals, however. See generally Applegate. Pails, supra note 31. at 261
(calling for additional testing of toxic chemicals pursuant to Toxic Substances Control
Act); Mary 1.. Lyndon, Informatwn.Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws 10 Product
and Use Data, 87 MICH. 1.. REv. 1795 (1989).
75. Risk characterization involves calculating a summary of the o\'erall magnitude of
health risk attributable to exposure to the chemical. including some discussion of the degree of scientific uncertainty about the risk. See Rosenthal et al .• supra note 7, at 293-95.
Generally. the assessor will multiply the cancer potency factor, which is usually expressed in
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limitations of risk assessment, an entire consulting industry has developed to produce such studies. 76
To scientifically determine the health benefits of the Amendments, society needs good risk assessments for each of the 189
listed pollutants and a solid understanding of the synergistic effects
of various combinations of these pollutants. 77 Unfortunately, this
ideal analytical strategy cannot be implemented with available exposure and toxicity data. Therefore, it is not possible to produce a
scientifically reliable estimate of section 112's potential health
benefits. 7s
Science can provide useful information, but ultimately society
must decide how to assess that information and to what extent it is
worth acquiring information in light of relevant costs.
b.

Expert and Public Approaches to Risk Management.

There are two common but opposing approaches to discussing
risk management issues: the "expert" approach,79 which tends to
emphasize formal benefit-cost analysis,SO and the "public" apunits of increased lifetime probability of cancer per kilogram of body weight per day of
exposure, times estimated exposure, which is expressed in units of milligrams of carcinogen per kilogram of body weight per day. Id. at 293. The calculation leads to an estimate of
the increase in the lifetime probability of cancer from the particular level of exposure. Id.
76. See Sawey et aI., supra note 71, at 479; see generally JOHN D. GRAHAM ET AL., IN
SEARCH OF SAFE1Y: CHEMICALS AND CANCER RISK (1988).
77. See Sawey et al., supra note 71, at 482.
78. Id.
79. Some commentators have argued that "experts" tend to focus simply on the expected annual fatalities, or "body count," caused by a chemical, whereas the lay person Is
often also concerned with additional factors. See generally Clayton P. Gillette & James E.
Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1071-85 (1990) (contrasting expert
and public perceptions of risk); see also W. Kip VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS 44 (1992) (discussing difference between individuals incurring risk of nuclear power involuntarily versus coal
miners cognizant of risks and who receive wage premiums for those risks): Donald T.
Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics ofEnviTfJ1lmental Law Reform, 10 YALE]. ON REG. 369, 418-19 (1993) [hereinafter Hornstein, Politics of
Environmental Law Refonn] (risk-based conceptualizations tend to undervalue subjective attributes of risk that concern public); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A
Nonnative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 562, 564, 584-615 (1992)
[hereinafter Hornstein, A Nonnative Critique] (contrasting expert and public perceptions of
risk).
80. See generaUy Dwyer, supra note 16, at 248 (arguing explicit cost consideration overemphasizes the costs, which are more easily quantifiable, and underemphasizes health concerns, which are difficult to quantify); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So
Paradoxical: The Rationale fOT Technology-Based Regulation, 41 DUKE L.]. 729, 731-36, 741 (arguing benefit-cost analysis is often based upon questionable assumptions and highly uncertain information, fails to consider many benefits of health and safety regulation, masks
distributional issues, underestimates the value of lives, and undercompensates workers),
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proach,81 which advocates a nontechnocratic and more diverse definition of relevant issues.
The extent to which section 112 of the Act favors either the
public or expert definition of risk will play an important role in the
character of EPA regulation. The one-in-one-million residual risk
standard in subsection 112(f) (2) (A) is a classic "body count" measure of environmental progress.82 The technology-based emissions
standards in subsection 112(d) are not directly based on the
number of expected fatalities, but reflect a narrow, technocratic
approach to standard setting that is more reflective of the expert
approach.83 On°the other hand, subsection 112(d)(2) allows the
EPA to consider "any non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements,"S4 and subsection 112(f) (2) (A) allows the agency to set more stringent standards than the "ample
margin of safety" test used before 1990, based upon "energy, safety,
and other relevant factors ...."85 These two provisions, especially
the phrase "other relevant factors," would appear to allow the EPA
to adopt a more "public" definition of risk if the agency were so
inclined. Because section 112 does not exclusively rely upon either
the expert or public definitions of risk, the EPA has at least some
discretion in which approach or combination of approaches to
take. Subsection II.C and Sections ill and IV of this Article will
address whether the EPA ought to have such discretion or whether
Congress should provide more guidance on how the agency should
manage risk.
c. Carcinogens and Noncarcinogens.

Carcinogenicity as a Flawed Metric. The one-in-one-million standard in subsection 112(f) is misleading because society cannot precisely assess cancer risks and therefore a risk range is more
appropriate. The cancer risk assessments used by EPA have imporThe bias toward overemphasizing costs may be exacerbated by informational biases because industry generally has the best information about the costs and feasibility of pollution controls. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 2480 Critics of the expert approach and offormal
cost-benefit analysis suggest that the analytical methods of the technical approach may
make it risk-preferring, in contrast to the public's risk aversion. Sa Gillette &: Krier, supra
note 79, at 1060-61.
81. See generally Gillette &: Krier, supra note 79, at 1071-85; Hornstein, A Norma/we
Critique, supra note 79, at 584-615.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2)(A).
83. See generally id. § 7412(d).
84. Id. § 7412 (d) (2).
85. Id. § 7412(f) (2)(A).
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tant shortcomings. Some of the weaknesses are inherent in the inadequate state of environmental science while others are
correctable with available data or alternative modeling procedures. 86 When hard data are lacking, the EPA may create a grossly
inflated upper bound for actual cancer risk from specific pollutants. Alternatively, EPA may create too Iowa bound despite conservative assumptions. 87 In addition, the EPA's methods
inadequately account for the possibility of synergistic and antagonistic effects of various pollutants,88 and the possibility of extrasensitive subpopulations for carcinogenic exposures. 89 The EPA
has used carcinogenicity as a common metric, but that single measurement cannot provide scientific answers on what is an acceptable cancer risk to diverse exposed subpopulations (such as
children) or how to make tradeoffs between a pesticide that may
present comparatively greater risks to consumers as opposed to
lesser risks to farmworkers and applicators than would the most
likely chemical replacement. 9o Even if t:\vo different chemicals
cause the same disease, they may produce effects that are more
concentrated in time or space. Proponents of a "public" definition
of risk would argue that even chemicals that cause the same disease
cannot always be compared on a single scale based upon expected
fatalities. 91 In addition, there are often substantial differences in
the weight of scientific evidence supporting whether a particular
86. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 76, at 160.
87. [d. at 149, 161. For example, an implicit assumption in the EPA method is that
the amount of toxic pollutant or its toxic metabolites that reaches a target cell is proportional to the amount of the pollutant inhaled, the so-called "administered dose." [d. at
161. For some chemicals, pharmacokinetic data are now available that contradict this assumption. [d. The EPA is beginning to use such data. [d. "Incorporation of new
pharmacokinetic data could lead to either higher or lower risk estimates than EPA would
normally report depending upon the specific chemica!." [d. at 162. New mechanistic dat.,
about the biological mechanisms of tumor formation in animals may lead to higher or
lower estimates of cancer risk in human beings than does the EPA's traditional practice of
simply extrapolating responses from rodents to human beings. [d.
88. See id. at 163; &part Backs EPA, supra note 42, at 1699.
89. See &pm Backs EPA, supra note 42, at 1699.
90. See Hornstein, Politics of Environmental Law Refonn, supra note 79, at 441.
91. For example, pesticide A may cause about 10 extra cancers a year while B has a 5
percent chance of causing 100 extra cancers annually and a 95 percent chance of causing
none. The "expert" approach would rate B to be half as harmful as A based upon the
expected number of cancers, but the lay person might argue it is more important to avoid
the worst case result and therefore might prefer A despite the likelihood that A will cause
more deaths. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 79, at 1083-84; Albert]. Nicholas & Richard].
Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Conservative Risk Assessments Distm Regulation, REGu.
lATlON, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 13, 22·24; see also Hornstein, A Nonnative Critique, supra note 79,
at 595-96 (providing similar example). Thus, whether it is acceptable to trade two units of
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substance is carcinogenic.92 Thus, Congress needs to direct the
EPA to adopt a more complex approach to assessing residual cancer risks.
Noncarcinogens and the Lack oj Adequate Data. The residual risk
provisions are seriously flawed because they do not consider noncancer risks. Congress' reluctance to address noncancer issues is
understandable in light of the complexities associated with assessing such risks and comparing them 'with cancer risks, but noncancer risks are too important to ignore.
There are substantial uncertainties about the comparability of
chemicals that cause different diseases, especially carcinogens and
noncarcinogens.93 Noncancer effects range from subtle to
B for one unit of A depends upon whether one accepts the expert model of risk or belieo.'eS
that the lay person correctly senses that risk depends upon a number of complex factors.
92. When assessing whether a chemical is a carcinogen, EPA scientists place each
compound into one of the following five categories based on the weight of the evidence:
(A) carcinogenic to humans: (B) probably carcinogenic to humans; (C) possibly carcinogenic to humans: (D) not classifiable as to human carcinogenicity; (E) eo.idence of noncarcinogenicity for humans. EPA Guidelines, supra note 72, at 33,994-34.000: Rosenthal et
al.• supra note 7, at 282-83. In the early reductions rule. the EPA classified all Group A
carcinogens as high-risk, and also placed some Group B and C chemicals on that list based
upon a two-tiered analysis that examined both carcinogenic and noncarcinogenic health
effects as well as exposure modeling. Compliance Extensions for Early Reductions, 57 Fed.
Reg. 61,983 (1992) (to be codified at 40 G.F.R. pt. 63) [hereinafter Early Reductions Rule).
A number of commentators argued that the EPA should adjust the weighting factor system
used in the agency's risk index for averaging to reflect the weight of scientific C'tidence. leI.
at 61,983. In the final rule, the EPA assigned a lower weight to Group C carcinogens. but
rejected weighing Group B chemicals lower than Group A ones because there is solid eo.idence of animal carcinogenicity for Group B chemicals, and the absence of conclusive
human data "most likely" reflects the difficulty of obtaining quality epidemiologic data. !d.
There are good reasons to argue, however, that at least some Group B chemicals that cause
cancer in animals may not cause cancer in human beings and therefore should be
weighted lower than Group A chemicals. Some critics of the EPA argue that agency scientists give undue emphasis to positive evidence of carcinogenicity from long.tenn animal
bioassays and do not include other types of scientific C'tidence that could change the
weight of evidence classification. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 284. Because the
EPA guidelines on hazard identification require that a finding of animal carcinogenicity be
taken as possible or probable evidence of human carcinogenic potential, the EPA has difficulty responding to new scientific data which suggest that some animal carcinogens do not
pose risks to human beings. leI. For example, a number of h)'drocarbon compounds. including unleaded gasoline, have been found to cause tumors in the kidneys of male rats.
but recent scientific research suggests that the biological mechanism responsible may be
unique to male rats and have no relevance to human beings. leI. at 284-85. The use of
these tumors as a basis for human risk assessment is a source of ongoing contro\'ersy in the
risk assessment community. leI. at 285.
93. As a general matter, scientists simply do not have good measures for comparing
carcinogens with noncarcinogens. See Witnesses oppose Avmzging, Trading Provisions in HON
Proposal at Public Hearing in Louisiana, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3045 (Mar. 26, 1993) [hereinaf-

HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 283 1994

284

STANFORD ENVIRONMENI'AL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 13:263

deadly.94 How can society compare the risks from chemicals that
present risks of such noncancer "endpoints" as birth defects, reproductive failure, acute poisonings, and neurological defects?95
Although cancer risks currently dominate risk assessment and management agendas, concern for other health risks probably will increase in the decades ahead. 96 The EPA is beginning to study
noncancer impacts, but this effort has been hampered by a lack of
available data. 97

Emissions Averaging of Carcinogens and Noncarcinogens: Comparing
the Incomparable. Unfortunately, at the end of the Bush administration, as part of its emissions averaging regulations for the early reductions program, the EPA developed a risk index based upon
arbitrary assumptions about the comparability of harm from carcinogens and noncarcinogens, in effect allowing increased emissions of carcinogens to be offset by noncarcinogens. 98 Two days
ter Witnesses]. In the rule for the early reductions program, the EPA admitted: "For the
carcinogens, the cancer potency factor is a straightfonvard measure of relative toxicity and
was used in conjunction with the weight of evidence classification to develop the weighting
factors. For the noncarcinogens, however, there is not a comparable measure of toxicity
that can be used consistently for pollutants with different health effects." Early Reductions
Rule, supra note 92, at 61,984. In the proposed rule for the synthetic organic chemical
manufacturing industry, the agency conceded: "The EPA is not able at this time to quantify
the noncancer effects so that they can be combined with the cancer health effects for the
HON." Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Seven Other Processes, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,608 (1992) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R pt. 63) (proposed Dec. 31,1992) [hereinafter Proposed HON].
94. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, A STRATEGY TO REDUCE RIsKS TO Punuc H~TH
FROM AIR TaXIes 1-9 (June 1985).
95. Hornstein, Politics of Environmental Law Refqrm, supra note 79, at 441.
96. While federal agencies are beginning to use quantitative risk assessment to assess
such noncancer health effects as kidney damage, neurobehavioral deficits, and developmental and reproductive effects, risk assessors still calculate and report cancer risks more
frequently than non cancer risks. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 271. In its major 1990 study,
CANCER RISK FROM OUTDOOR EXPOSURE TO AIR TOXles, the EPA included the Executive
Summary from a separate noncancer study as appendix C of the report.
97. See II AIR TaXIes, supra note 94, at C74 to C75. The agency has stated, however,
that, even though it cannot quantify the magnitude of noncancer risks, "ambient air concentrations of many pollutants may significantly contribute to potential noncancer health
risks associated with environmental exposure." I AIR TaXIes, supra note 94, at C72. The
National Academy of Sciences' most recent report on risk assessment of hazardous air
pollutants was unable to review noncancer effects.
98. See Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92, at 61,980-83; see also NESHAP for Source
Categories: Proposed Regulations Governing Compliance Extensions for Early Reductions
of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,338 (1991) [hereafter Proposed Early Reductions]. The early reduction program allows an emission source a six-year waiver of requirements to meet the maximum achievable technology standards required by 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(d) if the source voluntarily reduces its hazardous air emissions by 90 percent or its
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later, the agency also put fonvard a similar emissions averaging approach in the proposed national emission standard for hazardous
air pollutants emitted by the synthetic organic chemical manufacturing industry.99
The final rule published on April 22, 1994 for the synthetic organic manufacturing industry, however, significantly changed the
emissions averaging proposal. 100 It will be useful to examine both
hazardous particulate emissions by 95 percent on or before January I, 1994. Sit: id.
§ 7412(i} (5); David P. Novello &: RobertJ. MartineauJr., BtUer Earlier Than lAter: EPA ~ Air
Toxies 'Early Reductions' Program, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 401 (July 2, 1993); Air Pollution: Pr0posal on Hazardous Organic Emissions, Final Early Reduction Rules lsrud. by EPA, 23 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1707 (Nov. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Proposalj. As partofits regulations concerning the
early reductions program, the EPA adopted a weighted emissions trading scheme in which
a source can offset increases in high-risk hazardous air pollutants by larger \'Olume decreases in low-risk hazardous air pollutants based upon a risk index that assigns weighting
factors to each of 47 different pollutants. See generally Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92,
at 61,980-85. Environmentalists have attacked the EPA's risk index because they contend it
is impossible to compare on a single risk index different hazardous air pollutants, especially noncarcinogens that cause different diseases. S«, e.g., Witnesses, supra note 93, at
3045 (statements by Natural Resources Defense Council auorney David Driesen and other
environmentalists). In the early reductions regulations, the EPA made a number of questionable simplifying assumptions including assuming that most so-called "high.risk- noncarcinogens have the same weighting factor of 10 assigned to 19 high-risk carcinogens and
that other noncarcinogens and carcinogens not on the agency's high·risk list have a weight
of one for trading purposes. See Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92, at 61,970, 61,983-84;
Proposed Early Reductions, supra, at 27,354055. In the final rule, after considerable criticism of the agency's approach to assigning weighting factors to both carcinogens and noncarcinogens, the EPA increased the weighting factor from 10 to 100 for three
noncarcinogens: for mercury because of its persistence in the environment and potential
for bioaccumulation, and acrolein and 2-chloroacetophenone to provide an adequate margin of safety from adverse health impacts. Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92, at 61,970,
61,983. The EPA failed to address adequately e\'en the body count comparisons between
carcinogens and noncarcinogens, let alone more difficult questions such as whether it is
appropriate to equate deaths from carcinogens with deaths from other diseases or how to
compare chemicals causing long-term chronic illnesses with those causing deaths in the
short-term.
The Clinton Administration's EPA has clearly taken a diffcrent approach to emissions
averaging of hazardous air pollutants and comparing carcinogens and noncarcinogens
than the Bush Administration. In the proposcd rulc governing plant modifications, the
EPA now implicitly criticizes the weighting approach adopted in the early reductions rule
arguing that this approach "was not intendcd to SCl"\'e as a precedent for other programsand specifically states that "the weighting factors of onc and 10 for non<arcinogens, which
were based upon a broad policy decision for the early reductions program, are inadequate
for describing the differences in potency or scverity bctwcen pollutants for purposes of
offset comparisons under § 112(g). The actual difference in potency between the noncarcinogens could span many orders of magnitude.- Hazardous Air Pollutants: Proposed
Regulations Governing Constructed, Reconstructed or Modified Major Sources, 59 Fed.
Reg. 15,504, 15,563 (Apr. 1, 1994).
99. See Proposed HON, supra note 93, at 62,631.
100. Final HON Rule Could Cut Toxic Emissions From Chemical Manufacturing By 90 %, 24
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the proposals considered by the EPA as well as the final rule.
The Clinton Administration's EPA reopened public comment
on the standard for the synthetic organic chemical manufacturing
industry, and requested comment on five possible changes in the
emissions averaging pOlicy.lOl One possible change would have required facilities considering averaging to demonstrate that it would
not result in increased risk; such an individualized risk assessment
would be similar to this Article's proposal for sources seeking a variance from technology-based standards. lo2 The risk assessment
policies developed for approving emissions averaging would likely
prove helpful in developing regulations based on this Article's proposal. Because "many states have and use their own risk assessment
policies and tools, these states and local agencies would be authorized under this possible change to utilize not only the EPA guidance, but also any procedures approved by their own agencies, for
analyzing the risk equivalence of the compliance scenarios with
and without averaging."103 The EPA requested comment on
whether identifying all the hazardous air pollutants in the emisEnv't Rep. (BNA) 1883, 1883 (Mar. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Final HON Rule). The final rule
was published just as this Article was sent to the printer. National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from
the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Other Processes Subject to
the Negotiated Regulation for Equipment Leaks, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,402 (April 22, 1994)
[hereinafter Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants Rule). The final rule will be addressed in an
abbreviated discussion.
101. The first possible change would have given states the authority to omit the emissions averaging provisions without having to go through the § 112(1) rule delegation process, even if the state's statutory provisions do not grant the state authority to elect
requirements that are more stringent than the federal standards. See NESHAP: Organic
Hazardous Air Pollutants From the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry
and Seven Other Processes, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,478 (1993) [hereinafter Reopening Public
Comment); Comment Sought on Fwe Possible Changes To Emissions Averaging Policy in HON
Proposal, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1172 (Oct. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Five Possible Changes). The
second possible change would have required those facilities considering an averaging plan
to demonstrate it would not result in a greater risk than trying to comply without averaging. The third possible change involved the compliance period for emissions averaging;
the fourth would have limited the number of emission points allowed in an average. and
the fifth would have addressed the effect of missing monitoring data or parameter exceedances on averaging. Reopening Public Comment, supra, at 53,479.
102. Reopening Public Comment, supra note 101, at 53,479. To aid in the implementation of this requirement, the EPA considered publishing guidance setting forth examples
of what would constitute an adequate risk equivalency demonstration and requested public
comment on whether such guidance would be useful or necessary to implement the risk
demonstration requirement. ld. The decision to approve or disapprove any particular
averaging plan would rest with the agency implementing the emission standard, in most
cases a state or local air pollution control agency. ld. at 53,480.
103. ld.
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sions streams would pose difficulties for sources. Predictably, industry opposed giving states more discretion in determining the
conditions for emissions averaging, arguing that the EPA should
use uniform federal standards to facilitate emissions averaging.104
On November 29, 1993, Mary Nichols, EPA assistant administrator for air and radiation, stated that a majority of states are expected to prohibit emissions averaging of air toxies and that the
Clinton Administration would not force such averaging. lOS In
states allowing emissions averaging, Nichols indicated that the the
procedures would be carefully controlled, especially because synthetic organic chemical manufacturing facilities tend to be concentrated near low-income communities. lo6 She acknowledged that
industry has legitimate concerns about uniformity, but argued that
"a chemical facility situated in a large field in a rural area has a
'quite different impact from one sitting in a complex in the middle
of a large urban area' and should be treated differently."lo7
On March 1, 1994, EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner announced that the EPA would soon issue a final rule on hazardous
air emissions from chemical manufacturing plants, and on April
22, 1994, the agency published the rule in the Federal Register. 10S
The final rule limits averaging to emission points 'within the synthetic chemical manufacturing source category and also restricts
the number of points to twenty or twenty-five among which averaging may be conducted. lOO Most importantly, facilities choosing to
average their emissions would have to perform a risk assessment to
ensure that a net overall reduction in hazardous air emissions is
achieved and that public health and the environment are protectedYo The risk assessment required to justify emission averag104. Plan to Give States Discrelion on Averaging oj Toxic Emissions Mttls Indush] opposition, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1464, 1464-65 (Dec. 3, 1993).
105. StatesExpected to Avoid Averogingon Air Toxics, Agtncy 's Air ChiifSays, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1474, 1474 (Dec. 3, 1993).
106. Id. The EPA has recently become concerned about the potentially disparate
impacts of toxic pollution on low-income and especially minority neighborhoods.
107. Id. at 1475.
108. Rnal HON Rule, supra note 100, at 1883; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants Rule,
supra note 100. A discount factor of 10% is required in calculating credits for emissions
averages in the final rule. An exception is provided for reductions accomplished by the
use of pollution prevention measures. For pollution pre,·ention measures full credit \\ith
no discounting is allowed.
109. Rnal HON Rule, supra note 100, at 1883; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants Rule,
supra note 100, at 19,408.
110. Rnal HON Rule, supra note 100, at 1883; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants Rule,
supra note 100, at 19,408.
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ing would be similar in many respects to the risk assessment
proposed in this article to obtain an exception and therefore the
adoption of a risk assessment requirement for emission averaging
in one major industry suggests that this Article's proposal would be
feasible for at least some industries. Some environmentalists, however, continue to criticize emission averaging. Although states are
not required to adopt averaging, environmentalists fear that the
chemical industry will pressure states to adopt averaging. I II

Noncarcinogens and the Legislative History of the 1990 Amendments.
There is some evidence in the legislative history of the Amendments and in the statute itself that Congress intended to treat carcinogens and noncarcinogens differently. Section 301 of Senate
Bill 1630, in addition to requiring EPA to promulgate residual risk
standards for carcinogens, would have amended section 112 of the
Act "to promulgate a second round of standards for hazardous pollutants other than carcinogens where [technology-based] standards do
not reduce emissions to a level below the 'safe' threshold (the 'no
observable effects level' with an ample margin of safety), if a
threshold can be identified ...."112
The Amendments created a new subsection 112(g), which allows a source to avoid classification as a modified source if increases in one hazardous air pollutant are offset "by an equal or
greater decrease in the quantity of emissions of another hazardous
air pollutant (or pollutants) from such source which is deemed
more hazardous, pursuant to guidance issued by the Administrator
under subparagraph (B)."113 Notably, the statute requires that
Ill. Final HON Rule, supra note 100, at 1883-84.
112. S. REp. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3385, 3534 (emphasis supplied).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g) (1) (A). "The offset program applies only to modifications,
and not to the construction or reconstruction of new sources." Henry A. Waxman, An
Overview of the Clean Air Amendments of 1990,21 ENVrL. L. 1721, 178().81 n.269 (1991). In
this article, Representative Waxman argues, "When EPA promulgates its regulations, it
should require that the offsetting reductions occur within that same unit as the emission
increase. For purposes of§ 112 (g) (1), 'source' should be interpreted to refer to the 'unit,'
not the entire facility." [d. One must ask to what extent Representative Waxman's views are
authoritative; presumably a law review article counts less than actual remarks before
Congress.
Subsection 112 (g) (1) (B) requires the EPA to publish guidance within 18 months after
November IS, 1990, the enactment date of the Amendments, which deadline the agency
failed to meet, regarding the implementation of this subsection. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(g) (1) (B).
The EPA has issued a proposed rule on plant modifications that would impose stringent controls if a plant exceeded de minimis levels set forth in the rule. See generally HazardHeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 288 1994
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such EPA guidance consider the relative hazard to human health
resulting from the emissions of" each" of the 189 hazardous air pollutants listed in subsection 112 (b).ll" Further, subsection
112 (g) (1) (B) states that the guidance shall not authorize offsets
between pollutants where the increased pollutant "causes adverse
effects to human health for which no safety threshold for eh-posure
can be determined unless there are corresponding decreases in
such types of pollutant(s) ."115 This provision's reference to types of
pollutants might be read to preclude offsetting increases in emissions of a carcinogen with decreases in non-carcinogens. 11G
The residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) (2) (A) require
the EPA to promulgate a second round of standards if the technology-based standards in subsection 112 (d) "do not reduce lifetime
excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to emissions from
a source in the category or subcategory to less than one in one
million,"117 but do not specifically address noncancer risks. us Secous Air Pollutants: Proposed Regulations Governing Constructed, Reconstructed, or
Modified Major Sources, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,504 (Apr. I, 1994) [hereinafter Proposed Regma.
tions];Proposed Rule on Plant Modijicalwns Sets De Minimis Levels thal Trigger MACT. 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1915 (Mar. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Proposed Rule on Plant Modificalions]. In addition, the proposed rule would allow increases in one pollutant to be offset by a decrease in
another "more hazardous" substance, a form ofinterpollutant trading that may prove to be
very contentious. Proposed Rule on Plant ModijicalWns, supra. at 1916. The proposed rule
discusses a number of different approaches to weighting different types of chemicals for
offsetting purposes, and taking into account noncancer effects. Proposed Regulations,
supra, at 15,548-63. The proposed rule implicitly criticizes the weighting approach
adopted in the early reductions rule and strongly suggests that the Clinton Administration's EPA has taken a different approach to emissions averaging of hazardous air pollutants and comparing carcinogens and noncarcinogens than the Bush Administration. Ste
id. at 15,563.
114. 42 u.s.c. § 7412(g)(1)(B) (emphasis supplied).
115. fd. (emphasis supplied).
116. One commentator has suggested that, because of the provision's reference to
types of pollutants, it may preclude offsetting increases in emissions of a carcinogen \\ith
decreases in non-carcinogens. Russell S. Frye, Corporrm Cautions in the lmplcnmlalion ofAir
Toxies Provisions, in IMPLEMENTING THE 1990 Cu:AN AlR Ac:r: THE RACE fOR REGUlATIONS
295,301 (1991) (ALI-ABA Course No. 661, 1991). The EPA recently published a proposed
rule discussing a number of approaches to comparing different chemicals for offsetting
purposes. Proposed Regulations, supra note 113, at 15,548-63.
117. 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f) (2)(A).
118. Subsections 112(f) (2)(B) and 112(d)(4) authorize the EPA to apply a different
approach than the two phases of technolog)'-based and then residual risk regulation for
the small number of chemicals for which the EPA had already promulgated health standards based on the ample margin of safety language in effect prior to 1990. Sa id.
§§ 7412 (d) (4), 7412(f) (2) (B). Mercury is one noncarcinogen affected by these pro\isions.
but most noncarcinogens or carcinogens are unaffected. Sa40 C.F.R. § 61.52 (1993) (mercury emission standard).
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tion IV of this Article will discuss how Congress might provide guidance to the EPA on how to regulate noncarcinogens.
d.

"Hot-Spots."

Both marketable permit systems and technology-based forms of
regulation are usually designed to reduce aggregate pollution or
risk without forcing a particular level of control at any given facility
or locationY9 Consequently, "hot-spots," relatively high concentrations of particular pollutants, may accumulate in small areas
within the larger pollution control region. 120 Some pollutants do
not have significant site-specific impacts, but others create localized pollution problems around the emitting source. 121
The Amendments do not adequately address this problem.
The EPA will promulgate subsection 112(f) residual risk standards
for categories or subcategories of industries rather than individual
sources. 122 The one-in-one-million screening standard in subsection 112(f) (2) places some limits on "hot-spots," but residual risk
requirements only address the overall cancer risks of a source's
combined emissions of hazardous air pollutants, and do not measure the impact of specific pollutants on particular population
groups living around an individual source, including noncarcinogenic chemicals.
A more specific program is needed to address "hot-spots." Sitespecific exposure assessments are one way to identify "hot-spot"
problems at a particular facility. Of course, such assessments will
require standards for deciding when a particular pollutant poses
119. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1350 (1985).
120. See generaUy California Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act of
1987, CAL. HEALTH & SAFElY CODE §§ 44300-44384 (West Supp. 1994).
121. Some air pollutants do not have significant site-specific impacts; for example,
volatile organic compounds that can contribute to the formation of ozone. See RICHARD A.
LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POllUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA's BUDDLE
590 n.* (1986). Nonindustrial sources playa major role. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra
note 119, at 1356 n.53 (citing E. IiAEMISEGGER, THE AIR TOXIC PRODLEM IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF CANCER RISKS FOR SELECTED POLLUTANTS (EPA-450/1-85-001
(1985»; AIR TOXICS, supra note 94. In addition, carbon monoxide can create "hot-spots"
in or near tunnels and also around major intersections where motor vehicle traffic is heaviest. Henry A. Waxman et aI., Roadmap to Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990:
Bringing Blue Skies Back to Americas Cities, 21 ENVrL. L. 1843, 1902 (1991).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2). Residual risk emission standards are issued for categories and subcategories ofindustries even though the one-in-one-million screening criterion
for triggering the issuance of such standards is based upon individual plants within the
category or subcategory. Id.
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excessive risk. In addition, public participation may be especially
important when a "hot-spot" problem threatens people living in
the vicinity of a plant.
e. EnvironmentalJustice Concerns.
In recent years, there has been enormous controversy about
whether "locally undesirable land uses" such as toxic waste landfills
or sources of air toxies are disproportionately located in poor and
minority neighborhoods. 123 For example, there is evidence that
synthetic organic chemical manufacturing plants tend to be concentrated in poor neighborhoods. 124 While there is significant evidence of disproportionate siting, the evidence does not establish
whether the siting process itself, rather than market forces such as
residential mobility, cause the disparity.l25 Furthermore, methodological problems with existing studies call into question their va123. See generally Vicki Been. What!f Fairness Got To Do With It? EnvironmentalJustia and
tlzesitingoJLocally UruksirahleLAnd Uses. 78 CoRNEll. 1.. REv. 1001. 1002~3 (1993). There is
also evidence that cleanups occur more quickly and fines against polluters are higher in
predominantly white areas. Poor Blacks Hope 10 Halt Planl.s: EPA to Investigate AlkgatitmS that
Rights were Vwlated, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER. Dec. 20. 1993. atAS [hereinafter Poor BlacJu]. On
February 11. 1994. President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898. which requires gO\"
ernment agencies to develop policies to ensure that! (1) minorities and low·income populations have access to public information related to the human health and em;ronment;
(2) agencies conduct activities related to the health and environment in a manner that
does not discriminate against low-income and minority populations; and (3) agencies consider disproportionate health effects in conducting research and coUecting data. Sa generally Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and LowIncome Populations. Exec. Order No. 12.898. 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). This Article's
proposal would require firms seeking exceptions from national standards to address em;'
ronmental justice issues and would also allow citizens to raise these issues when a firm
applies for a permit to emit hazardous air pollutants.
A full discussion of whether environmental racism exists, and of possible legal remedies, is beyond the scope of this Article.
124. Stales Expected 10 Avoid Averaging on Air Toxies, Agmq!f Air ChiLJ SaJs. supra note
105, at 1474.
125. Been. supra note 123. at 1014. Professor Been recently published an article examining empirical evidence for the market dynamics hypothesis. Vicki Been. Locally Unck-

sirable LAnd Uses in Minority NeirJWorhoods: Dispropartionale Siting or Marna Dynamics?, 103
YALE LJ. 1383 (1994). 'While her evidence is inconclusive. two reports funded by business
interests have challenged claims that plants specializing in the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste are more apt to be found in minority neighborhoods; a study by
University of Massachusetts researchers using Census tracts concluded that such facilities
are more likely to be found in working-class. white neighborhoods than in minority communities. Two RepOTts Dispute Claims that Siting oj Commmial Fadlilics Discriminatory. 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 2100, 21O~1 (Apr. 15. 1994). This Article's proposal for an "exceptions process" is designed to reduce the risk to exposed populations regardless of whether the initial
siting process was discriminatory.
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lidity.126 In any case, the justice concerns need to be considered in
any proposal for amending the Clean Air Act's section 112, since
such amendments will have a greater impact on low-income
communities.
Residual risk standards under subsection 112 (f) do not specifically address siting issues. 127 An important question is to what extent residual risk standards should take into account issues such as
potentially disparate impacts on poor people and minorities. At
least in theory, particular subpopulations may be disparately affected by certain toxic substances. 128 The more difficult question is
whether the air toxics program should seek to reduce the tendency
of plants to locate in poor and minority neighborhoods. This Article proposes an increase in the level of agency scrutiny. An increased burden should be applied to an applicant when a variance
is sought for a facility located in a "poor" or "minority" neighborhood. 129 This Article will not, however, directly attempt the far
more socially complex task of forcing new sources to locate, or existing sources to relocate, in non-minority or relatively wealthy
neighborhoods. ISO Site-specific exposure assessments could determine who is being affected by a facility's emissions of air toxies and
would be more precise than current research defining minority
neighborhoods in terms of census tracts or zip codes. This Article's proposal would indirectly address distributional inequities by
126. Been, supra note 123, at 1014-15 ("some studies define neighborhood as broadly
as a municipality, while others use census tracts or zip code areas, and some draw concentric circles around LULUs [Locally Undesirable Land Uses].") (citations omitted).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(1).
128. Taking into account the fact that Mrican-Americans have statistically poorer
health than whites raises difficult questions about whether equality of treatment or equality
of results is required. See Been, supra note 123, at 1035. This Article's proposal would
emphasize examples where there is scientific evidence, for example, that Mrican-Americans are disproportionately affected by a specific chemical or disease rather than simple
statistical differences among groups in their overall health.
129. For example, the EPA is currently investigating plans to build a hazardous waste
incinerator in Carville, Louisiana because there are already ten hazardous facilities in a sixmile area, the population is predominantly minority, and toxic emissions around Carville
are more than three times the state average. POIJT Blacks, supra note 123, at A8. Dan Borne,
president of the Louisiana Chemical Association, argues that there was no intent on the
part of industry to discriminate against minorities, but that industry had located in this
area because of the availability of natural gas, the Mississippi River for transportation, and
large acreage at a reasonable price. Id.
130. Such a relocation program raises complex issues about defining a "fair" siting
process and perhaps even more complex questions about how to achieve such fairness
when fair siting proposals run counter to the free-market ideology of the United States. See
generally Been, supra note 123, at 1008-09, 1015-85.
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providing technical assistance grants to citizen groups to enable
them to challenge agency standards or industry variance
applications.
f.

Multimedia and Indirect Effects.

The residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) (2) do not address potential multimedia and indirect impacts. These omissions
are not surprising because both problems have virtually been ignored until recently. In the past the EPA has largely approached
each medium problem separately: air, water, pesticides and land
disposal. l S l For example, rulemaking normally originates in the
four media program offices, which are sometimes referred to as
the "lead offices,» under the four assistant administrators with
rulemaking responsibility. Until recently single-medium program
offices did not spend much time thinking about the effects of their
regulations on media that are regulated by other program offices. lS2 In large part, Congress in the past enacted statutes requiring the agency to focus on each medium separately. ISS The
National Environmental Policy Act and Toxic Substances Control
Act in theory are supposed to bring an integrated approach to environmental management, but they have had little real impact on
the EPA's media policies. lM
131. See generally Laxshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughlu!ays: &opming of the Environmental Mind, 1989 WIS. L REv. 463, 467-69, 476-79, 488-92, 516; Inttgrattd Pollution
Control: A Symposium, 22 ENVIL. L 1 (1992).
132. See Thomas O. McGarity, TheInUmalStruclrmoJEPA Ru/mwking. 54 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70, 85-86 (1991).
133. See generally Guruswamy, supra note 131, at 467, 471, 476-79, 49()'92 (media statutes generally do not consider multimedia impacts).
134. Read literally, the National Environmental Protection Act would appear to require the EPA to consider multimedia impacts when the agency issues rules ha\ing a significant impact on the environment See Guruswamy, supra note 131, at 477-78, 49()'92. But
Congress has provided major exceptions and courts have largely accepted the argument
that certain provisions in the media statutes are the "Cunctional equh-alent- of an assessment. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (Clean Water Act exempts EPA from impact assessments
except for municipal waste water treatment grants and permits Cor discharges by new
sources); 15 U.S.G. § 793(c) (1) (Clean Air Act generally exempts EPA Crom en\ironmenL.-u
impact requirements). Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 381, 384-85
(D.G. Gir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (holding § III oC Clean Air Act constituted a functional equivalent of impact statement and therefore exempted EPA Crom
NEPA; strict Act timetables another consideration); Guruswamy, supra note 131, at 477-79,
484-87, 491-92.
Professor Guruswamy argues that the Toxic Substances Control Act could be used to
move towards the administrative implementation of an integrated approach. See grnaallJ
Guruswamy, supra note 131, at 522-30.
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A number of commentators have argued in general for an integrated approach to pollution control that would tackle problems
on a multimedia basis because controls on air pollutants often simply result in the discharge of these chemicals into sewers or landfills without reducing the overall number of harmful substances
released into the environment. 135 Little research has been done
regarding the potential multimedia impacts of air toxics, but the
Amoco-EPA study discussed below in Subsection III.B.2.e suggests
that regulatory policies should take a more multimedia approach
in addressing the risks from hazardous air pollutants. For instance,
let us suppose that production changes necessary to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants below the one-in-one-million
threshold result in more sludge for landfills or the discharge of
more water effluent. There is nothing in the residual risk provisions to address these types of issues. Nor is it clear that the one-inone-million standard adequately considers the impact of hazardous
air pollutants on other media. For example, there is no requirement for a risk assessment to determine the indirect impacts of
emissions that enter the food chain and are eventually ingested by
humans.
Partly in response to controversy over an incinerator in East Liverpool, Ohio, the Clinton administration imposed new restrictions
on hazardous waste incinerators, including requiring a site-specific
risk assessment prior to issuing combustion permits. IS6 EPA head
Carol Browner has promised to increase "public participation" in
the approval process, a policy this Article believes should be applied in general to sources of hazardous air pollutants. IS7 The EPA
will require full risk assessments, including assessment of the risk of
indirect exposure to emissions through the ingestion of chemicals
that reach the food chain, as part of all new hazardous waste incinerator permits and also includes industrial furnaces and boilers
that bum the waste as a fuel. 138 Some EPA regional offices are
135. See generally Guruswamy, supra note 13I.
136. See EPA Draft Strategy for Combustion of Hazardous Waste in Incinerator and
Boilers; Interim Final Guidance on Waste Minimization for Hazardous Waste Generators
(May 18,1993), reprinted in 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 157,160 (May 21,1993) [hereinafter EPA
Draft Strategy] (site-specific risk assessments); Timothy Noah, EPA Unveils Plans to Curb
Incinerators of Hazardous Waste by Blocking Growth, WALL ST.]., May 19, 1993, at 86; Temporary CaPacity Freeze' Announced By EPA On New Hazardous Waste Incinerators, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 131 (May 21, 1993) [hereinafter Temporary Capacity Freeze1,
137. Noah, supra note 136, at B6.
138. See EPA Draft Strategy, supra note 136; Pennit for $120 Million Incinerator Requires
Risk Ass=ment, Tight Controls, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 243 Uune 4, 1993) (In response to new
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currently conducting indirect risk assessment 159 The EPA has released a draft addendum updating its approach to indirect risk assessment. 140 Don R Clay, who served as EPA assistant
administrator for solid waste and emergency response during the
Bush administration, has predicted that the Clinton administration
will expand the use of indirect risk assessment in future rulemaking and has observed that such a policy would "add another two to
three orders of magnitude of increased risk."141
The EPA has recently proposed strict paper-industry regulations that combine air and water requirements for the first time
rather than addressing them separately.142 The so-called cluster
rule takes what the EPA terms an "ecosystem-wide" approach to
reduce and prevent discharges of dioxin and other toxic pollutants. l43 According to the EPA, the rule will "virtually eliminate" all
dioxin discharges into rivers and other surface waters, and will cut
toxic air emissions by roughly 70%.144 Industry has argued that the
proposed rule is too costly and will force some older plants to
EPA guidelines, Texas Water Commission ordered firm to cany out comprehensi\'e assessment of risk posed by the facility as well as risk from potential indirect routes of exposure);
'Temporary Capacity Freae~ supra note 136, at 131; Use oJ IndiTta IWk Assessmml LiklJ in
Future Rule-Making. Former Official Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 262 Uune II, 1993) [hereinafter Former Official Says].
139. Officials from Regions I, IV, and V are conducting indirect risk assessments on
selected hazardous waste combustion facilities seeking final permits or permit modifications. Hazardous Waste: Indirect IWk Assessments Gel Coopmuion From Facilities Despite Conams
Over Timing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1724, 1724 (Feb. 4, 1994). It is not clear whether the
other seven EPA regions also are collecting data for the indirect risk assessments. ItL
140. In November, 1993, the EPA released a draft addendum to the 1990 Methodology for Assessing Health Risks Associated with Indirect Exposure to Combustor Emissions.
Id. The Science Advisory Board's Human Exposure Committee is re\ie\\ing the draft addendum and has drafted a letter to EPA Administrator Browner expressing serious concerns. Id.; Hazardous Waste: Indirect IWk Assessmenl Draft Addendum Calkd Dtjicimt in SAn
Letter to Browner, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1723 (Feb. 4, 1994) (Human Exposure Committee
stated draft addendum relies too much on default data, with little validation, lacks information on the occurrences and effects of upset e\'ents such as natural disasters or accidents,
does not consider cumulative impacts from existing facilities in addition to the impacts
from a single plant, and should look at regional impacts beyond 50 kilometers from the
facility boundary). Industry and state officials have argued that the EPA should significantly modify its draft guidance before the agency makes indirect risk assessments a permit
requirement. Hazardous Waste: Draft Guidance on Indirect IWk Assl!SS11ll7lu NwJ.s Changrs. Industry, State Officials Say, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1892 (Mar. 4, 1994).
141. Use oJ Indirect IWk Assessmenl Likely in Future Ruk-Making. Former Official Says, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) 262 Uune 11, 1993).
142. Timothy Noah, EPA Seeks Stria Paper-Industry Rules Aimed at Culting Dioxin, Air
PoUution, WAll. ST. j., Nov. 2, 1993, at A24.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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close.I 45 On the other hand, environmental groups have criticized
the proposal because it does not totally eliminate use of chlorine
from the papermaking process. I46 The use of a combined rule is
intended to make regulatory actions less burdensome to
industry. 147
Section 112 does not provide any answers on how the EPA
should take into account multimedia and indirect risk factors in
regulating hazardous air pollutants, although subsection 112 (d) (2)
allows the EPA to consider "any non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy requirements .... "148 The residual risk
provisions in subsection 112 (f) (2) (A) will eventually require the
EPA to examine the excess cancer impacts of air emissions from
each major source after technology-based controls are in place, but
the statute does not explain whether the EPA may consider only
direct impacts of air emissions in calculating excess cancer risks or
must consider multimedia or indirect impacts beyond generally authorizing the administrator to consider "safety" and "other relevant
factors."149 Under Chevron ~ deference principle, the EPA probably
could simply ignore the multimedia and indirect impacts of
sources of air toxics if it chooses to do so, but such an approach is
at odds with its stated goal of placing increasing emphasis on multimedia impacts. I5o This Article's proposal would require firms
seeking a variance to address multimedia and indirect impacts, and
allow interested citizens to request more stringent regulation of a
source or a source category if there is evidence of significant multimedia or indirect impacts. Eventually, the EPA should consider
developing "cluster" or combined rules for as many industries as
possible.

145. Id.
146. Id. When used as a bleaching agent, chlorine is converted into dioxin and other
potentially toxic chemicals. Id.
147. Id.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2}.
149. Id. § 7412(f) (2)(A).
150. The EPA is currently making some efforts to use existing legislation to address
integrated, multimedia concerns. See Thomas L. Adams Jr. & M. Elizabeth Cox, The Environmental SheU Game and the Need for Codification, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367,
10,368-69 (1990); Applegate, Perils, supra note 31, at 330-32 (advocating a wider role for the
Toxic Substances Control Act in information development).
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Technology-Based PoUution Control Standards

a. Economic Criticisms of Technology-Based Standards.
In a technology-based system of regulation, an agency sets stan-

dards based not on health effects, but on the control capacity of
current or expected technology, or by mandating the use of a particular technology or process. I51 A number of economists and
legal scholars have argued that technology-based pollution control
standards are inefficient because they are typically uniform across
an entire industry. This approach does not take into account the
actual impacts of specific sources on ambient air or water quality,
impacts which vary 'widely depending upon the source's location. I52 There is good reason to believe that the technology-based
standards in subsection 112 will be inefficient among different industries because the top 12% of plants in pollution control effectiveness in one industry may be vastly different from the top 12% in
another industry. Some industries, therefore, are likely to bear
higher compliance costs without regard to their ability to reduce
pollution or the actual impact of their pollution upon surrounding
populations. I5s
Moreover, technology-based statutes and regulations usually fail
to promote technological improvements because industry often
lacks any incentive to go beyond the technology specified in the
EPA's reguIations. 154 The one-in-one-million residual risk standard
151. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 31, at 268 n.28. 1£ an industrial process or
product generates some nontrivial risk, technology-based regulations generally require the
responsible plant or industry to install whatever technology is a\..ulable to reduce or eliminate this risk, as long as the costs of doing so will not cause a shutdown of the plant or
industry. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 119, at 1335.
152. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 119, at 1334-40 (arguing technolog)'-based regulation is inefficient compared to market·based); Note, Ttchnology-BasedEmWion and Efflu,
ent Standards and the Achieuement ofAmbient Environmental Objedives, 91 YALE L.J. 792, 794-98
(1982) (arguing technology-based standards are inefficient in achieving ambient standards
because they fail to take into account geographical differences in air or water quality or
cost differences among individual firms and fail to promote any important non-cconomic
goals).
153. See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(3)(A). The Administrator has the authority to set a
standard higher than that achieved by the best performing 12% of the existing sources and
theoretically could address interindustry disparities. Id. § 7412(d) (3). Based upon the experience of the Clean Water Act, however, the Administrator is unlikely to force technology in industries that have lagged behind others in pollution control efforts. One solution
would be to allow trading between firms in different industries, but this Article rejects that
solution because of difficulties in comparing risks in a trading scheme and instead proposes individual variances to achieve greater efficiency while protecting the public health.
154. Richard B. Stewart, RegulaJion. ImlOVation, and Administrative Law: A Ccmuptual
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does, in theory, require the EPA to issue standards that may promote technological improvements needed to achieve "an ample
margin of safety." The dismal failure of the pre-1990 health-based
regulations, however, raises serious questions about whether the
EPA will actually issue residual risk standards that are so stringent
they force firms to shut down unless the firms adopt cutting-edge
technology. 155
Many critics of technology-based regulation advocate marketbased solutions,156 and some have suggested the use of trading
schemes similar to the EPA's risk index for emissions averaging of
air toxiCS. 157
b.

Defenders of Technology-Based Standards.

Skeptics have argued that proponents of market-based systems
are overly optimistic about the ease with which government can set
accurate charges, define property rights, or establish market mechanisms. I5S A number of academics contend that technology-based
emission or effluent standards are the most practical solution to
pollution control in light of pervasive uncertainties about the impact of chemicals on human health and the environment. 159 Some
advocate technology-based systems because they may be less information-intensive. I60 Others argue that EPA officials have someFramework, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1256, 1284 (1981) [hereinafter Stewart, Innooation); Note, supra
note 152, at 799.
155. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f); McQuaid, supra note 14, at 459 (predicting that
Congress will rescind the residual risk program because of its potential expense and lim·
ited benefits).
156. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 119, at 1341·51 (advocating transferable mar·
ketable permits); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 69, 82-84 (1988); Note, supra note 152, at 811·12 (advocating zoned marketable per·
mit scheme).
157. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 119, at 1360-61 n.62 (suggesting "mutual
fund" approach to control related pollutants through permits based upon weighted aver·
age of volume and risk "where appropriate"); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental
Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 CoLUM. J. ENVIL. L. 153, 161·62 (1988) (arguing in
favor of trading schemes for toxies, although conceding it may not yet be feasible to do so
for pesticides and other chemicals that presently elude workable quantification),
158. See Applegate, Wcmt Things, supra note 22, at 288 n,45; Guruswamy, supra note
131, at 501-07; Joel A. Mintz, Economic Reform ofEnvironmmtal Protection: A Brief Comment on
a Recent Debate, 15 HARv. ENVIL. L. REv. 149, 158, 161 (1991).
159. See gmerally Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1267·75, 1331·32 & passim
(arguing uniform, technology·based standards work better than market-based or other
"finc-tuning" schemes because of limited information about the risks of chemicals and
ecological systems); see also Mintz, supra note 158, at 149-64 (discussing debate between
advocates of market-based regulation and technology-based regulation).
160. Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing StrateHeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 298 1994
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times advocated market-based measures to weaken environmental
regulations, especially during the Reagan administration. IGI
c. Technology-Based Standards Are Inefficient.
There is considerable evidence that technology-based pollution
control standards are inefficient. A recent EPA/Amoco joint study
of an Amoco refinery in Yorktown, Virginia suggests that uniform
pollution control standards, including technology-based approaches, are inefficient because the EPA's standards are often
based on obsolete information, ignore multimedia pollution
problems and do not provide industry with incentives to reduce
pollution at lower COSt.1 62 In addition, the EPA's experience with
Section 307 of the Clean Water Act addressing water toxies suggests
that technology-based controls can achieve a certain degree of pollution reduction, but must be supplemented with individual control strategy techniques that address individual "hot-spots" and
examine a source's impact on 'water quality.l63
Professor Gaines has suggested that it will be much more difficult to determine technology-based approaches for air toxies than
for the treatment of 'water toxies. l64 The EPA is already behind
schedule in issuing subsection 112(d) technology-based standards
for various categories and classes of industry.l65 Professor Gaines
observes that the complexities of regulating air toxies will increase
when the second phase of residual risk controls goes into effect. l66
Ultimately, he concludes that there are no easy answers to regulating air toxies. This Article generally concurs with that conclusion,
but proposes some possible solutions to the problem.
gies for Health and Environmental Regulalwn, uw & CoNTEMP. PROns. 159, 20lHlS (1983); see
also Applegate, Perils, supra note 31, at 268.
161. SeeLatin, GFine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1271-72; if. Guruswamy, supra note 131,
at 503.
162. See infra notes 299-307 and accompanying teXL
163. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1) (1988); Oliver Houck, TkRLgulalion ofToxicPolllllants Under
the Clean Water Act. 21 Env't L Rep. (Envtl. L InsL) 10,528, 10,53642, 10,547-49 (1991);
Pedersen, supra note 156, at 70-73 & passim.
164. Gaines, supra note 25, at 302-03.
165. As of the fall of 1993, the EPA had issued only two final rules for technolog)'based emission standards for categories or subcategories of major sources of air toxies: one
for dry cleaners, and the other for steel mills' coke ovens. John H. Cushman,Jr., Siaies and
Government Lag in Meeting Clean Air Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at A18. In the spring of
1994, the agency issued a final rule governing the toxic emissions of the chemical indusuy,
a rule that is expected to eliminate one billion tons of toxic emissions a year. Ste supra
notes 100, 108-11 and accompanying texL
166. See Gaines, supra note 25, at 303.
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Enactment of the Proposal
1. Degree of Statutory Specificity.

This Article's proposed statute must be understood in light of
the debate about congressional specificity in regulatory statutes.
Commentators have made an important, if imperfect, distinction
between "goals statutes," which announce goals and authorize delegates to promulgate controls on conduct in furtherance of those
goals, and "rules statutes," which demarcate permissible and impermissible conduct. 167 Commentator advocacy between these two
types of statutes corresponds to preferences for agency decisionmaking versus congressional policy making. 168 An advocate of
technocratic regulation tends to favor goal-oriented statutes that
grant discretion to the agency and would probably approve of the
residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) because of the discretion it provides the EPA Those who favor strong congressional
control and are skeptical of agency expertise would likely favor
strict rules-oriented statutes. There is a middle ground as well. 169
Commentators have disagreed about whether the Clean Air Act
is a "rules" or "goals" statute. 170 In the 1990 Amendments, Congress moved away from the goals-oriented "ample margin of safety"
language in section 112 of the Act and adopted detailed rules on
the number of hazardous air pollutants and the stringency of technology. The second phase of residual risk standards may return to
the failed policies of the pre-1990 version of the statute. l7l
167. See Applegate, Wor.st Things, supra note 22, at 302 n.128 ("A rules statute sets out
relatively specific standards of conduct for the regulated industry; a goals statute gives a
general mandate to an agency, which the agency must translate into rules of conduct.")j
David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 740 (1983). "Whether a statute works to define permissible conduct depends on the
context." [d at 784. A plausible argument can be made that there is no real distinction
between goals and rules because all rules need interpretation and all goals reflect some
choices. [d. at 787. Schoenbrod, however, argues that there is a genuine distinction between a rules statute in which the legislature states what is permissible and impermissible
in a range of situations and a goals statute in which the legislature deals solely with objectives. [d. He concedes that the distinction is not a bright line and may change as society'S
customs evolve. [d. at 788.
168. See generally Applegate, Wor.st Things, supra note 22, at 289-304 (discussing technocratic regulatory tradition and its skeptics, including proponents of rules statutes).
169. See id. at 328-331.
170. Compare BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WIlJ.IAM T. HAssLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRn' AIR 1012 (1981) (criticizing the Clean Air Act as an example of overly specific post-New Deal
legislation) with Schoenbrod, supra note 167, at 753, 766-67 (criticizing Clean Air Act legislation as a goals statute).
171. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
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Neither goals nor rules statutes are a panacea for solving environmental problems. 172 Congress, however, could and should enact a
statute that provides more guidance to the EPA on adopting
residual risk standards.
Another distinction used in discussing the degree of statutory
specificity is the distinction between narrative and numerical tests.
Existing environmental statutes regulating carcinogens contain primarily narrative tests for priority-setting and standard setting. 17S
There are three major types of environmental narrative statutes: 174
(1) technology-based statutes that require the EPA to clean up the
environment to the degree that is technologically achievable;175 (2)
balancing statutes that require the EPA to balance the costs of control and health benefits; and (3) health or risk-based statutes that
require the EPA to clean up the environment to a degree that assures the protection of public health. 176 Hybrid narrative statutes
are either difficult to categorize or combine elements of each type
172. Rules statutes may be counterproductive if they subject the details of adminutration to the constant supervision and second-guessing of congressional committees. Sa grnerally Michael Herz, Judicial Texlualism Meets Congrwional Miaomanagemmt: A Potential
Collision in Clean Air Act InterpretaJion, 16 HARv. ENvn.. L. REv. 175 (1992) (arguing congressional micro management and judicial textuali5m combine to produce deleterious results); Richard J. Lazarus, The Ntf1ected Q:lestian of Congrwional Ovmight oj EPA: Qpis
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Walch the Watchm Themsdves)7, 54 LAw S: ComaIP.
PROBLEMS 205 (1991) (arguing congressional oversight committees interfere too much in
EPA's work); David S. Broder S: Stephen Barr, HiU's Miaomanagrnzmt of Cabintl Blurs &poration oj P(JVJCTS, WASH. Posr, July 25, 1993, at AI, A16 (dUcussing recent trend toward
congressional involvement in departments' management functions). While thu Article advocates greater congressional scrutiny of the EPA's emwions averaging program for air
toxics, it is also sensitive to preserving discretion on the part of the agency. In addition,
rules statutes could stifle technological innovation if a statute mandates a particular technology. Matt Ridley, H(JVJ to S7TUJther Innovation, WALL ST.J.,June 9, 1993, at A12 (arguing
EPA regulations on technology used to limit nitrogen oxide emwions delayed introduction of promising new technology). Furthermore, rules statutes may lead to other di5tortions. On the other hand, goals statutes may allow the EPA or the Office of Management
and Budget to ignore congressional intent.
173. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 273.
174. Id. at 296.
175. Id. There is a distinction between statutes that require the EPA to base standards on what is currently achievable as opposed to technology-forcing statutes. St1NSTE.IN,
supra note 22, at 627-28 n.85. Some commentators have argued that technolog)'"forcing
statutes have not worked well because industry generally has more information than the
EPA about what technologies are likely to be technologically feasible in the next fh·e or ten
years, but that industry has little incentive to share such information \\ith the agency if the
result will be higher compliance costs. See e.g., Stewart. Innovation. supra note 154, at 128283, 1296-97, 1300-01.
176. See supra notes 50-85 and accompanying text (di5cussing di5tinction between
health and risk).
.
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of narrative statute. 177 For example, the pre-1990 version of section 112 was a classic health-based statute requiring the EPA to set
emissions standards for air toxics that would protect the public
with an "ample margin of safety. "17S The first phase of the Amendments is clearly technology-based in nature. The second phase of
residual risk standards requires a health-based approach in part,
but also provides the EPA with enough discretion to allow implicit
and perhaps even explicit balancing. In addition, the statute includes a numerical one-in-one-million screening standard, but provides no guidance on what the second round of emission standards
might encompass. One might classify these residual risk provisions
as a hybrid narrative statute.
2.

Agent)' Capture, Public Choice Theory, the Race-to-the-Bottom

Rationale and an Exception Process.
a. Agency Capture.
An exception process may allow a regulated entity to "capture"

an agency's decisionmaking process. 179 Capture is less likely to occur when an agency is regulating several industries with competing
or conflicting interests. ISO Some commentators have argued that
the EPA as a whole is not captured. lSI In another article, this au177. Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 313-14.
178. Despite the statute's health-based nature, critics have charged that the agency
implicitly considered cost and technology before and perhaps even after the Vinyl Chloride
decision.
179. A leading administrative law treatise defines agency capture as follows: "An
agency is captured when it favors the concerns of the industry it regulates, which is wellrepresented by its trade groups and lawyers, over the interests of the general public, which
is often unrepresented. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS
§ 1.7.2 (2d ed. 1992). There is an enormous literature on the phenomenon of "agency
capture" of regulators by regulated industry and commentators have sharply disagreed
over to what extent such capture takes place among major federal agencies. See, e.g.,
MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGUlATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT CoMMISSION 74-95, 169-71
(1955) (regulated industry tends to capture its regulators); Alfred C. Aman,Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis ofExceptions Rules, 1982 DUKE LJ. 277, 326-28 ("The capture doctrine
is inapposite, however, when the regulations involved cut across several industries."); Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agent)' Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL- LJ. 34,34-35,49-54
(1993) [hereinafter Superfund Contractors] (capture more likely to occur in a single program
even if agency as a whole remains uncaptured). But see Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 342 (1974) (capture theory unsatisfactory because it lacks any theoretical foundation as to why the regulated industry should
be the only interest group able to influence an agency).
180. See generaUy Aman, supra note 179, at 327-28; Mank, Superfund Contractors, supra
note 179, at 50-51.
181. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 309-10; RichardJ. Lazarus, The Tragedy ofDistrust in
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thor suggested that it may be easier for special interests to capture
an agency's decision on a particular plant or program even if the
agency as a whole remains uncaptured, and an individualized exceptions process might enhance the possibility of capture. 182
Whether an agency can be captured by a regulated firm depends to a considerable extent upon whether countervailing interest groups actively participate in the regulatory process.
Proponents of agency capture theories generally assume that regulatory agencies begin serving particular private interests once the
public interest that led to the formation of the agency dissipates. ISS
Richard Posner has criticized the theoretical foundation of agency
capture theories on the ground that they do not explain "why the
regulated industry should be the only interest group able to influence the agency."184 Others have argued that there is strong evidence that so-called "public interest groups" or countervailing
interest groups in fact influence agency policies, especially where
agencies regulate multiple industries. 185 There is considerable evidence that the public has retained interest in environmental issues
the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROns. 311, 315-17
(1991); see generally Mank, SuPeifund ConlTtzelon, supra note 179, at 34-35,49-54.

182. See generally Mank, SuPeifund Conlracttm, supra note 179, at 34-35, 49-54 For example, there is some evidence that "Superfund contractors- make too many policy decisions because the EPA lacks sufficient experienced staff, however, the evidence of actual
capture is tenuous. Id. at 80. In a case study of how local air quality management districts
in California grant variances, the authors suggested that the large Bay Area [which includes
San Francisco, Oakland and SanJose] and South Coast [Los Angeles and Orange County]
Air Quality Management Districts were relatively immune to capture, but that the smaller
Kern County Air Quality Management District "is viewed as being more susceptible to the
economic interests of industry and the community.- Marc Melnick &: Elizabeth Willes,
Comment, Watching the Candy Store: EPA Ouerfiling of Local Air Pollu#on Varianca, 20 Ecol.OGY L.Q. 207, 224 (1993). The Kern County District has recently joined a new unified
district, the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Quality Management District, and the authors
of the case study suggest that " [t]his change has probably changed the regulato!}' climate in
Kern County by bringing in a wider range of perspectives toward air pollution. The hearing board will be drawn from a more diverse area and will be less susceptible to local
pressure." Id. at 241 n.241. On the other hand. Professor Aman has argued that an exceptions process will not facilitate agency capture.
183. See generally BERNS'IlUN, supra note 179. at 87-90; EMMETTE REDFORD, ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CoNTROL 386 (1952); Aman. supra note 179. at 326-27 n.209;
Mank, SUPeifund ContraclcTs, supra note 179. at 34 n.l. 50-52.
184. Posner, supra note 179, at 342. Professors Gillette and Krier, however. suggest
that some groups may have asymmetric access to the administrative process. S« grnaally
Gillette &: Krier, supra note 79, at 1064-70.
185. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRAC'i: WHAT GoVERNMENT ACENCIES Do AND WIN
THEY Do IT 83-85 (1990) (arguing that since 19705 it has become rare to find an agency
serving only a regulated industry's interests); Mank, Superfund Cort1racJms, supra note 179, at
50-51.
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and that the EPA on the whole has not been captured. 18G Thus,
even if an exceptions process could be abused by regulated firms
bent upon capturing the air toxics program, effective measures to
encourage public participation could defeat any such efforts. 187
3.

Public Choice Theory.

Public choice theory assumes that each person is an egoistic,
rational utility maximizer and that behavior based upon these assumptions applies not just to market transactions, but also to nonmarket political decisionmaking. I88 Public choice models often
treat the legislative process as a micro economic system in which
interest groups manipulate the political process to obtain "rents" in
the form of tax relief, subsidies or favorable regulation in order to
increase their wealth in excess of what the group could achieve in
the marketplace without legislation. I89 On the other hand, proponents of "civic republicanism" argue that politics can and ought to
consist of deliberation reflecting the values of all citizens. They
reject the central economic assumptions about human behavior in
public choice theory, contending that individuals in many cases are
willing to sacrifice private interests to the common good. 1!JO
Public choice theory would suggest that legislation affecting
particular geographic areas would be dominated by legislators
from that area and that local interests would tend to triumph over
more diffuse national public interests. I91 Thus, it is important to
186. See Mank, Superfund CantractOTS, supra note 179, at 50-51; see generally Dwyer, supra
note 16, at 278,309-10; Lazarus, supra note 181, at 364-65; WILSON, supra note 185, at 83-85;
see also Hornstein, A Nonnative Critique, supra note 79; Irma S. Russell, The Role of Public
opinion, Public Interest Groups, and Political Parties in Creating and Implementing Environmental
Policy, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,665 (1993).
.
187. The presence of public interest groups can substantially increase the cost of lobbying expenditures by a firm that is trying to influence an agency and defeat attempts by a
regulated firm to "capture" an agency. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAlTII\VAlTE, RESPON.
SIVE REGUlATION: TRANSCENDING TIlE DEREGUlATION DEBATE 71-86 (1992).
188. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The jurisprudence ofPublic Choice, 65 TEX.
L. REv. 873, 878 (1987).
189. See id.; Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition 11mong Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371, 371-74 (1983);Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public.Regarding Leg·
islation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode~ 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 22324 (1986).
190. See generally Hornstein, Politics, supra note 79, at 413; Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YAI.E LJ. 1493, 1513 (1988); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican justification for
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1511, 1512 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Reviva~ 97 YAI.E LJ. 1539, 1548-49 (1988).
191. See generally A1yson C. Flournoy, Beyond the ·Spotted Owl Problem": Learning From the
Old·Growth Cantroversy, 17 HARv. ENVIl.. L. REv. 261, 305-06 (1993).
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consider whether the capture of influential legislators by important
industrial actors could result in congressional pressuring of the
EPA to modify residual risk standards or to grant exceptions to the
advantage of favored industries. Public participation, however, can
overcome this tendency. For example, when environmental
groups were able to capture national public attention about the
spotted owl through the news media, lobbying pressure created by
local interests seeking to cut old-growth forests was neutralized. 192
Accordingly, an exceptions process may be more vulnerable to special interest lobbying of Congress than nationally uniform
legislation.
The public participation portion of this Article's proposal is
designed to enhance the possibility of "republican civicism" in the
exceptions' decisionmaking process and to lessen the tendencies
of an exceptions process to allow regulated firms to obtain special
favors from legislators or bureaucrats as the public choice model
predicts. Furthermore, this Article's proposal would give Congress
a greater role in establishing residual risk standards despite the
possible criticism that Congress is really not representative of the
public interest.
a.

States and the "Race-to-the-Bottom."

In the context of a federalist scheme for air and water pollution
control in which states play the primary role of regulating firms
and in which the EPA plays a supervisory role, an expanded exceptions process would give states more discretion in making regulatory decisions. So long as a state's program meets certain
minimum requirements, the Title V air permit statutory scheme
assumes that states will make the initial decision about granting or
revising a permit. I9S The EPA has issued a final rule pursuant to
subsection 112(l) establishing procedures for the agency's approval
of state air toxics rules or programs that are at least as stringent as
applicable section 112 rules and even to allow states to enforce
state rules in place of certain federal rules promulgated under section 112 despite industry's call for uniform federal rules. 194
192. Id. at 305.
193. See generally 42 U.S.G. §§ 7661-7661d. The EPA may object to any permit and
citizens may petition the EPA to challenge any permit approval by the agency. Id.
§ 7661d(b).
194. See generally id. § 7412(1) (state can develop and submit to Administrator a § 112
program that is at least as stringent as federal standards); Approval of State Programs and
Delegation of Federal Authorities, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,262 (1993) (final rule to be promul-
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A number of commentators have argued that uniform, federal
legislation is necessary to prevent states from engaging in a socially
undesirable "race-to-the-bottom," relaxing their environmental
standards to attract and retain industry.195 Professor Stewart has
argued that public interest groups are more effective at the national level than the local level because there are higher transaction costs for local groups to organize. There are economies of
scale for national groups and donors to groups may be more willing to give to national environmental causes. 196 The problems arising from the relative ineffectiveness of local public interest groups
could be ameliorated by having the federal government or industry
provide financial assistance to such groups. Active local environmental groups could alert the EPA to exercise its objection power
over state-issued permits if state officials neglect environmental
concerns to attract industry.197 Section IV of this Article proposes
that the EPA or industry applicants for exceptions provide grants
to groups raising bona fide challenges that need money to research
critical issues related to an exception.
b.

Public Concerns and the Democratic Critique.

Advocates of a "public" definition of risk belong to a larger
school of thought that questions the very legitimacy of agencies
making tradeoffs between health and cost. They contend that Congress should make these fundamental policy decisions rather than
agencies. 198 For these commentators, quantification is undesirable
gated in 40 C.F.R. Parts 9 and 63); Plan to Give States Discretion on Averaging of Toxic Emissions
Meets Industry opposition, supra note 104, at 1465 (industry opposes allowing states too much
flexibility in administering air toxies programs because of resulting inconsistencies and
uncertainties).
195. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating InleTstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-theBottom" Rationale fUT Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L REv. 1210, 121()"11 n.l
(1992) (citing sources); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice'! Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196, 1212
(1977). Recently, the "race-to-the-bottom" rationale has been questioned. See generally
Revesz, supra.
196. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 195, at 1213-15.
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2) (citizen can petition Administrator to object to
state-issued permit).
198. See generally Applegate, Worst Things, supra note 22, at 289, 298-302 (discussing
four critiques of technocratic agency decisionmaking: (1) the informational critique argues agencies lack sufficient good information to make "expert" decisions; (2) the legitimacy critique contends public participation values should trump tcchnocratic
decisionmaking; (3) the rationalist critique argues in favor of clear statutes to guide agency
discretion; and (4) the historical critique argues agencies tend to underrcgulate if givcn
too much flexibility because it is easier not to make a decision).
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because the determination of whether a particular risk is "reasonable" or "unreasonable" is a fundamentally political decision resting on a broader set of values, many of which are not
quantifiable.199 They believe that quantification is meaningful only
to a limited extent where lives and deaths are involved.2°O Democratic critics of quantification usually want choices about who bears
the risk of toxic substances to be made by Congress rather than an
expert agency.201 Critics of technocratic decisionmaking often use
legal techniques such as broadened standing, expanded participation in the decisional process, as well as citizen suits and petitions
to guarantee broad citizen access to the regulatory process.202
Some commentators however, argue that broad discretion to
apply knowledge and technocratic expertise is better. They therefore want Congress to set only broad goals.20S Judge Stephen
Breyer, among others, has argued that the public often overreacts
to risks and that thus Congress is incapable of addressing risk comprehensively.204 In his view, greater knowledge and public awareness do not necessarily lead to better regulation.205 Judge Breyer's
solution is to create an elite reviewing body of civil servants within
the executive branch to coordinate risk regulation. 20G WhileJudge
Breyer's assessment of how well the public and Congress have handled risk assessment issues in the past has considerable merit, his
199. See id. at 300 (discussing political critique of quantitative decisionmaking).
200. See id. at 300-301: see generally Gillette & Krier, supra note 79, at 1070-85: Guruswamy, supra note un, at 504-09.
201. See Applegate, lV013t Things, supra note 22, at 301-02 (discussing democratic critics of expert agencies and quantitative decisionmaking).
202. See id. at 301-02; Gillette & Krier, supra note 79, at 1104-05; Richard B. Stewart,
The RefOT7TUllWn of American Administralive Law, 88 HARv. 1.. REv. 1667, 1676-81 (1975).
203. See generally ACKERMAN & HAssLER, supra note 170, at 5-6 (Congress should provide only the "most general kinds of policy guidance" to free the agency to engage in
rationalist decisionmaking processes); Dwyer, supra note 16, at 283 (arguing "that literal
interpretation of symbolic legislation would be a mistake and that the Agency should be
allowed to refonnulate symbolic legislation because rational policymaking involving \"Olatile social issues is more likely to be done by an agency than by the legislature, particularly
where statutes are difficult to amend and enacting symbolic legislation is an accepted
means of doing business.") & passim; Lazarus, supra note 181, at 355 (finding that "wasted
resources and misdirected priorities" are the result of the "combination of impossible statutory mandates and increased judicial access"): see also Applegate, mmt Things, supra note
22, at 296-98 (discussing rationalist models of regulation that emphasize agency discretion
and congressional role limited to broad goal setting).
204. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CiRCLE 33-42 (1993); Sam
Kazman, Risk Regulation Run Amok, WAll. ST. J., Nov. 5, 1993, at A7 (book re\iew ofJudge
Breyer's Breaking the Vicious Circle).
205. See generally BREYER, supra note 204, at 42-51; Kazman, supra note 204, at A7.
206. See generally BREYER, supra note 204, at 59-80; Kazman, supra note 204, at A7.
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solution, as well as those of many other technocrats, underplays the
need for public participation and legitimacy.
Advocates of a technocratic solution to risk regulation contend
that bureaucratic agencies possess sufficient public legitimacy.
Some commentators argue that agencies can allow broader participation by interested parties than Congress207 and that the Administrator of the EPA is more accountable than most members of
Congress. 208 The legitimacy arguments of technocrats are less convincing than their criticisms of the inability of the public and Congress to assess complex risk issues.
Society is better offwhen Congress and the President enact legislation that makes the hard political choices about how much risk
is acceptable in light of relevant costs. Ultimately, how to regulate
and to assess the comparative risk of chemicals causing different
diseases is a political question that must be addressed through collective risk preferences as expressed in the democratic process. 209
Critics of technocratic decisionmaking correctly observe that such
an approach is information-intensive, leaves fundamental decisions
to unelected officials, and does not always produce effective and
efficient regulation. 210 Because of the disagreements in the scholarly community between the expert and public definitions of risk,
Congress should make the basic policy choices about which factors
should be included in risk assessment and management of hazardous air pollutants. Even though individual members of Congress
in some ways are less accountable than the administrator of the
EPA or the agency itself, Congress as a whole and the President are
207. See Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1300 ("Agencies can develop better
technical expertise, address a wider range of issues concurrently, allow broader participa·
tion by interested parties, and respond more rapidly to new information than Congress
ordinarily could.").
208. See id. at 1300 n.165 (arguing supposed greater public accountability of Con·
gress than agencies is largely a myth because few members of Congress know enough about
air pollution issues to make informed decisions and therefore the real issue is whether
Congress should delegate its authority to a few peers together with committee staff or
administrative agencies subject to congressional oversight); Gaines, supra note 25, at 307·08
(arguing that congressional committees or federal judges regularly scrutinize the actions of
the EPA, and that "the administrator of the EPA is arguably more readily held to account,
through the media and through public pressure on the president, than most legislators,
whose individual actions are often obscured in secrecy and the relative anonymity of memo
bership in a group of 535 people subject to inquisition only every two or six years.").
209. See Hornstein, Politics ofEnvironmental Law Refann, supra note 79, at 442: see gencr'
aUy Applegate, Worst Things, supra note 22 (Congress should give EPA specific directions
for setting priorities and goals).
210. See Applegate, Worst Things, supra note 22, at 281, 289-304.
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more accountable when they enact legislation that provides clear
direction for an agency's exercise of discretion.
As a matter of general policy, Congress should encourage public participation in significant environmental decisions because
such involvement lessens the risk that the agency will be "captured"
by special interest groupS.211 Furthermore, Congress should provide opportunities for public participation in risk assessment decisions at individual sites because chemicals may have different
impacts on diverse exposed subpopulation groups such as children, minorities, consumers or workers. Because there are often
disagreements about the impacts of toxic pollutants on a particular
community, Congress should provide for significant public opportunities for comment on permit applications and trading approvals
despite the potential for Not-In-My-Back-Yard opposition.212 Section IV will show how this Article's proposal would allow potentially
affected citizens more meaningful participation and opportunities
to challenge proposed permits than the current system.

III.
A

"BRIGHT

LINES"

AND EXCEPTIONS

Bright Line Rules

1.

"Bright Lines" and Standard-8etting

Legislators have increasingly considered using numerical risk
levels, or "bright lines," as a means to reduce executive branch discretion and to gain greater congressional control over risk management.213 In 1989, Congress considered mandating an interim
residual risk standard of one-in-ten-thousand and a final standard
of one-in-a-million, but the enacted Amendments incorporated a
"bright line" only as a screening and priority-setting device.214
Congress has also considered enacting "bright lines" in legislation
governing food safety and water quality standards.215 For example,
211. See generally Mank, Superfund Canlroclars, supra note 179, at 5()'51 (strong public
interest in environmental issues helps prevent capture of EPA); sa also Hornstein, Polilics oj
Environmental Law Refonn, supra note 79, at 417-19,440-46 (discussing theory that emironmental law reform results from "republican moments" of significant public im'Oln:ment).
212. See generally Been, supra note 123, at 1001'{)9 & passim (discussing distributional
consequences of siting locally undesirable land uses); Bradford C. Mank, The Two Headed
Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up HaztlT"tlgus Waste Dumps: Can Economic [nanlilla or Mediation
Slay the Monster'!, 19 B.C. ENVI'L. AFF. L. REv. 239, 239, 272-85 (discussing "Not·In-My-BackYard" problem and possible solutions).
213. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 275.
214. [d.
215. [d. at 327-329.
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a 1991 proposal in Congress sought to amend the Clean Water Act
by limiting "the probability to not more than 1 in 1,000,000 that an
individual with high exposure to dioxins in [state] waters will be
diagnosed with cancer as a result of such exposure over a lifetime."216 New Jersey's 1984 Amendments217 to its Safe Drinking
Water Act218 establish a one-in-one-million standard for persons ingesting dioxins for a lifetime. 219 Mter the enactment through the
voter initiative process of California's Proposition 65, the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986220 adopted
regulations setting the level of significant risk for discharges into
drinking water and other media at one-in-100,000 on a lifetime baSiS. 221 Wisconsin's surface water quality standards also employ a
bright line, stating that "the incremental cancer risk from exposure
to surface waters may not exceed 1 in 100,000."222
The use of mandated numerical risk levels in prescribing the
desired stringency of residual risk controls may create a misleading
sense of legislative control and mask possible agency manipulation.
Regulators can often plausibly manipulate modeling assumptions
and interpret data to change risk estimates by factors of a thousand or more. 223 The dangers of manipulation are especially great
when considerable scientific uncertainty surrounds an issue. Subsection 112(f) 's one-in-one-million standard is misleading because
it suggests that the EPA can apply a clear metric to carcinogenicity
when that is not the case. It is even more misleading to apply a
numerical "bright line" approach to noncarcinogens causing different types of diseases or multimedia impacts when there is no
scientific consensus. Whether any legislative metric is appropriate
will be discussed below.
2.

''Bright Lines" and Priority Setting.

Some commentators have argued that legislative "bright lines"
216. H.R. 2084, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (a) (1991) (proposed April 24, 1991); see Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 328.
217. Act of Jan. 9, 984, ch. 443, 1983 NJ. Laws 1801.
218. NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 58.12A·1 to -25 (1992).
219. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 58.12A-13(b) (1992); Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 331.
220. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25249.5-.13 (1992); Kristen R. Stevens, Regulating
Toxies at the State Leve~ Proposition 65's Warning Requirement, 9 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 84 (1990).
221. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 26, § 22-12703(b) (1992); Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at
331.
222. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 105.09-.10 (1989); Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 332.
223. See Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 360; see also Dwyer, supra note 16, at 276
(discussing post-Vinyl Chlmide benzene standards).
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can also be used as a priority-setting device to direct an agency to
target for regulatory consideration those chemical exposures which
exceed a bright line.224 In addition, Congress might require the
EPA to initiate rulemaking, which is currently often a matter of
agency discretion, if risk assessments suggest that the magnitude of
a problem exceeds some specified numerical standard, or to refrain from rulemaking if the magnitude of the health problem is
less than some specified bright line.225 According to Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray and John D. Graham, "From a scientific perspective, the use of cancer risk estimates in priority-setting is less
problematic than it is in standard setting. Risk assessment techniques may establish relative risk with more certainty than they establish an absolute level of risk protection. "226
Professor Applegate has argued that the Amendments to section 112 essentially represent a form of priority-setting in which the
agency must establish a schedule for action regarding listed chemicals based upon stated criteria such as: known or anticipated effects, quantity and location of emissions, and efficiency of
grouping categories by pollutants or technologies.227 While observing that the technology-based phase of regulation does not grant
flexibility in standard setting in the way his priority-setting model
of legislative control advocates, he maintains that Congress clearly
recognized the value of trading stringency for speed and scope by
enacting Amendments that defer regulation of the health-based
level of "residual risk" in favor of quick risk reduction based upon
the more easily determinable best available technology standard.228
224. See Rosenthal et aL, supra note 7, at 329-30; sa gtnmJlLy Applegate, mmt Things,
supra note 22, at 282 & passim (arguing that locus of legislative control should be mo\'Cd
from standard setting stage of regulatory process to earlier priority·setting phase).
225. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 330.
226. Id.
227. See Applegate, Wont Things, supra note 22, at 327. Professor Applegate has pro-

posed that Congress should provide broad parameters for agency action in particular
cases, but should give specific directions to the agency for setting priorities and goals. Ste
generally id., at 281-82. His plan would move the locus oflegislati\'e control from the standard setting state of the regulatory process to the earlier priority-setting phase. Id. at 282.
"Specifically, EPA would have considerable discretion to target risks and to select 1C\'Cls of
regulatory stringency, but its discretion would be constrained by a comprehensh'e plan for
toxic risk reduction which the agency would adopt in accordance with congressional guidelines." Id.
228. Id. at 327. He criticizes Congress, however, for exempting the section 112 priority-setting process from judicial review except for failure to set a schedule at all. Id.; ste 42
U.S.c. § 7412 (e) (4) ("no action •.• shall be final agency action subject to judicial review.Congress has however carved out a § 7607 exception).
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Applegate contends that the Amendments to section 112 demonstrate that it is feasible to use priority-setting to direct agency action. He recognizes, however, that there are several practical
difficulties in implementing the scheme-"not the least of which is
commensurability of toxic risks .... "229
The use of priority-setting in the first phase of the statute, along
with more specific rules on the number of air toxics and the stringency of technology-based standards, may have been a wise move
in light of the slow pace at which the EPA regulated hazardous air
pollutants before 1990. The use of priority-setting and screening
techniques in lieu of standard setting, however, went too far in the
residual risk provisions of the statute. Congress should have given
the EPA more guidance on the definition of what is an "ample
margin of safety" in light of the controversies surrounding the use
of that term prior to the enactment of the Amendments.
Rosenthal, Gray, and Graham have argued that Congress wisely
abandoned its attempt to establish bright line standards of one-inten-thousand and one-in-a-million in the residual risk provisions of
the statute and correctly adopted the one-in-a-million standard as
merely a priority-setting and screening standard for initiating further regulation. 23o They contend that advocates of bright lines
who see them as a way to guarantee particular policy outcomes
should be wary because congressional participation in risk assessment procedures can have unpredictable outcomes. 231 For example, they point out that one version of the Senate's Amendments
would have required the EPA to protect the maximally exposed
individual near a factory rather than a hypothetical maximally exposed individual-a change that could have reduced estimated exposures by a factor of 100 at some sources. 232 They argue that
"bright lines" do not guarantee outcomes and that risk assessment
techniques can be manipulated by agencies to change policy
results. 233
While "bright line" standards can be arbitrary and are subject to
manipulation, the residual risk provisions currently leave too much
discretion in the hands of the EPA. The only guidance the statute
provides as far as how the EPA must set a second round of emis229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See Applegate, Wtmt Things, supra note 22, at 327-28.
See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 275, 323-27, 330, 360.61.
ld. at 344.
ld.
ld. at 344, 360.61.
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sions standards, is that the agency has the authority to adopt the
approach in its 1989 Benzene standards. Commentators have criticized these standards for giving the agency too much discretion to
consider cost and technological factors. In addition, the statute
fails to address adequately the risks of noncarcinogens, multimedia
and indirect impacts, and disparate impacts on diverse e>..-posed
subpopulations. Thus, this Article disagrees with the argument
that the priority-setting and screening nature of the residual risk
provisions are adequate.
Even if Congress chooses to retain a priority-setting approach
that allows the EPA to determine the appropriate emission standard and ample margin of safety for a particular chemical or category or subcategory of industry if the excess cancer risk exceeds
one-in-one-million, Congress should at the very least identify the
reduction of noncarcinogenic risks as a priority for the EPA to consider when it issues emission standards under subsection 112(f)'s
residual risk program.
B. Exceptions and Flexible Regulation

1. Exceptions and Technology-Based Regulation.
This Article argues that the technology-based controls for air
toxies in subsection 112(d) are a good place to start, but that the
residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) should be used to provide exceptions234 from the technology-based standards. both to
provide additional protection and to lower standards where they
are too costly and their relaxation will not endanger the public
health. Market-based solutions are inappropriate because we lack
sufficient information to compare chemicals that cause different
diseases.
Subsection m.B will examine whether an "exception process"
should be created to allow variances for individual firms from the
technology-based and residual risk variances in section 112.255
234. Commentators often cite the implementation problems, expenses, and inconsistencies associated with an "exceptions" or "waiver" policy. See grnmzlJy Colin Diver, The
optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 70-71 n. 31 (1983); Latin, MFintTuning", supra note 11, at 1324 n. 286; Stewart, Innovation, supra note 154, at 1319 n.195.
This Article acknowledges the dangers ofttying to attempt regulatory solutions that are too
complicated, costly and potentially counter-producti\·e. The Amoco-EPA study and the experience with using technology-based controls to reduce water toxies suggests, howC\'Cr,
that society must experiment with bold, new regulatory initiatives to tackle such issues as
multimedia pollution, "hot-spots," and environmental racism.
235. Another approach would be to set standards entirely through individual adjudi-
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While strong arguments can be made against allowing an exceptions process for toxic chemicals, this Article's proposal for an exceptions process for sources of air toxics seeks to benefit both
industry and public safety.
a. The Case for Exceptions.
Some scholars have argued that even detailed rules fail to account for the full variety of situations to which they arguably apply.236 In particular, regulatory rules often leave too little room for
individualized justice.237 Such rigid and highly specific provisions
often characterize statutory rules as well as administrative ones. 238
Administrative agencies can tailor the application of statutory
or administrative rules to special cases either through ad hoc, "dispensatory" discretion, or through an "exceptions process" in which
the agency considers applications for waivers, exemptions, or variances from a rule in a procedure that incorporates limited protections for applicants and other affected parties. 239
Without a variance option, many sources "would have a greater
incentive to hide violations from inspection and regulation."24o It is
important to encourage regulated firms to practice voluntary selfdisclosure because regulatory agencies usually lack the resources to
detect all violations. Further, it is economically rational for regulated firms to commit violations even where there is a significant
risk of agency detection because these agencies rarely bring encations when a source of air toxies seeks a permit, but a totally individualized process
would create enormous administrative burdens. See E.!. du Pont Nemours & Co. v. Train,
430 U.S. 112, 123-27, 132-35, 138 (1977); Stewart, Innwation, supra note 154, at 1265·66
(distinguishing between standards that are applied uniformly to an entire category of in·
dustry or processes and screening techniques applied through "hand·tailored" individual
determinations); see generally Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11 (arguing in favor of uni·
form standards and criticizing attempts to "fine-tune" statutes). The residual risk provi.
sions in subsection 112(f) require screening assessments regarding excess cancer risk after
technology·based are installed for individual sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f).
236. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUcnON TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 48-63 (1954);
H.LA. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 627·29
(1958); Jeffrey M. Sellers, Regulatory Values and the Exceptions Process, 93 YALE L. J. 938
(1983).
237. See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 25 (1982); Aman, supra note 179, at 288-92; Sellers, supra
note 236, at 938.
238. See Sellers, supra note 236, at 938 n.3, 941-42).
239. Id. at 938 (advocating exceptions process).
240. See Melnick & Willes, supra note 182, at 247; John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deter·
rence, and Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAw & Soc. REv. 179, 179-80 (1984) (contrast·
ing deterrence-oriented enforcement strategy with "cooperative" enforcement strategy).
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forcement actions against all violators. Even when they do, agencies and courts are often unwilling to impose drastic sanctions that
would force a firm to shut down.241 An exceptions process may
convince some firms that the regulatory process is "fair" and that
they should comply as a matter of civic responsibility.242 Thus,
some commentators suggest that an exceptions process would promote a more cooperative regulatory environment that leads to
more effective enforcement than an inflexible, deterrence-oriented model of enforcement.243 Exceptions might, therefore, foster a cooperative atmosphere where regulators work with a source
to find solutions to reduce emissions.244
This Article proposes an exceptions process for sources of air
toxies regulated under subsection 112 of the Act. Commentators
have distinguished between "hardship" exceptions, which in the
regulatory context are usually based upon financial distress or technological infeasibility, and "fairness" exceptions, which may be
based upon such grounds as equal protection, comparative fairness, estoppel, or reasonableness as measured by a cost-benefit
analysis. 245 This Article will discuss both types of exceptions, using
examples from the Clean Water Act. and will propose that sources
of air toxies be allowed "fairness" exceptions where the cost of regulation is disproportionate to the ambient air quality benefits and
the exception will not pose an unacceptable health risk, but will
advise against "hardship" exceptions because of the health dangers
of air toxies.
b. The Case Against Exceptions.
Numerous commentators have argued that allowing variances
or exceptions to national, uniform standards can create implemen241. See generaUy Melnick & Willes. supra note 182. at 247-348.
242. See generaUy id. at 248-49; BARDACH & KAGAN. supra note 237. at 7; Sellers. supra
note 236. at 944-46.
243. See id. at 248-49; see generally BARDACH & KAGAN. supra note 237. at 123-62; Kuru
HAWKINS. ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGUlATION AND THE SoCtAL DEflNmON OF
POLLUTION 105-55 (1984); Scholz, supra note 240. at 179-80.
244. See generaUy BARDACH & KAGAN. supra note 237. at 144-49; Melnick & Willes. supra
note 182. at 249.
245. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.s. 116.
162 n.21 (1985) (Marshall,J.. dissenting); Aman. supra note 179. at 293-94; Martin Shapiro,
AdministTativeDiscretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE 1..J. 1487, 1504 (1983); Peter Schuck, U71t71
the Exception Becomes the Rule: RegulaUny Equity and the Fonnuialion oJ an EnttgJ Policy Through
an Exceptions Process. 1984 DUKE 1..J. 163. 283-89. There are also policy exceptions that
focus less on the individual characteristics of the petitioner and more on overall policy
goals. See Aman. supra note 179. at 293-94.
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tation problems, increase the expense of administration and result
in inconsistencies among similarly situated regulated firms.246 Administrators generally prefer uniform standards to more individualized approaches because ignoring differences among firms reduces
decisionmaking costs and may reduce strategic behavior by firms
seeking special treatment from regional federal administrators,
state or local officials, or pursuing costly litigation in order to obtain a variance from uniform standards. 247 Professor Howard Latin
has argued, "the implementation of variances based on individualized circumstances raises numerous problems: high decisionmaking costs, frequent litigation, inconsistent results, persistent delays,
increased opportunities for manipulative behavior by applicants or
administrators, and inadequate participation."248 Perhaps for
these reasons, courts now rarely require that "legislative" rules include waiver provisions. 249 The case against exceptions and for
uniform application may be especially strong where regulatory
schemes further important national objectives such as health or
safety or civil rights. 250
2.

Air and Water Pollution Control Variances.

a. Air Pollution Variances, Revisions and Extensions.
It is useful to examine how Congress and the EPA have provided for exceptions as part of the current regime for air and water
pollution control. For criteria air pollutants, variance applications
from requirements in a state implementation plan251 are typically
reviewed and initially determined at the state level,252 require rea246. Colin S. Diver, The optimal Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 70-71
n.31 (1983); Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note II, at 1324 n.286; Stewart, Innavation, supra
note 154, at 1319 n.195 (arguing that waiver process involves high costs and is unlikely to
promote innovative technology).
247. See Stewart, Innavation, supra note 154, at 1266; see generally Latin, "Fine-Ttming,"
supra note 11.
248. Latin, "Fine-tuning", supra note 11, at 1323.
249. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv.
393, 419 (1981).
250. Id. at 431-32; Sellers, supra note 236, at 955.
251. To achieve the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for each criteria pollutant within the statutory time limits, the Act requires each state to adopt and submit for
EPA approval a State Implementation Plan specifying how state and local procedures and
regulations will enable all areas in a state to achieve those standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a).
For critical evaluation of this process, see William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act
Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1059, 1078-88 (1981); Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure,
Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1688-1715 (1991).
252. States seeking to revise a plan must follow strict procedures similar to those necHeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 316 1994
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sonable notice and a public hearing,253 and then must be approved
by the Administrator of the EPA as a revision to the plan. 254 Subsection 112(i) provides several different types of extensions for
sources of air toxies, but these exemptions merely postpone the
inevitable and do not provide a permanent exception from applicable technology-based emissions standards provided in subsection
112 (d).255
b.

Clean Water Act Variances.

E.ffluent limitations for point sources under the Clean Water
Act are primarily based upon industry-wide technology-based standards.256 Similarly, subsection 112(d)'s technology-based emission
limitations are promulgated for categories and subcategories of industry.257 Thus, the Clean Water Act may serve as a potential
model for developing an exceptions process for sources of air
toxies.
c.

Fundamentally Different Factors Variance.

The Clean Water Act provides a far more complex series ofvariances and modifications than the Clean Air Act. 258 Subsection
essary for approval of the original plan. 42 U.S.c. § 7410(k), (I); 40 C.F.R. § 51.104 (1993);
Melnick & Willes, supra note 182, at 213-14.
253. 42 U.S.c. § 7410(1): 40 C.F.R. § 51.104.
254. See 42 U.S.c. § 7410(1): 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.104, 51.105, 51.112 (1993). Sa grntmlJy
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (holding in dicta that
proposed revisions cannot be approved by EPA if it would cause the pian to fail to ensure
maintenance of the national standards). The 1990 Amendments repealed the n:'oision
provisions discussed in Train, 42 U.S.c. § 7410 (a) (3), and added the somewhat more stringent provisions in § 110(1), which state that "[t]he Administrator shall not approve a n:'oision of a plan if the revision would interfere with any applicable requirement concerning
attainment and reasonable further progress (as defined in section 7501 of this title), or any
other applicable requirement of this chapter." 42 U.S.c. § 7410(1). Until the EPA approves a plan revision, the federal government may still enforce the original pian C\-en
though the variance may bar state or local enforcement. 40 C.F.R. § 51.105. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 540-41 (1990).
255. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(i) (3) (compliance schedule for existing sources), (4)
(Presidential exemption), (5) (early reductions), (6) (other reductions), (7) (extension
for new sources), (8) (coke ovens).
256. See generally 33 U.S.c. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b) (1988): E.!. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (holding EPA may by rule set induslr),\ide efi)uent standards under Oean Water Act rather than set standards as part of the permit-issuance process for individual plants). Under § 302 of the Oean Water Act, the Administrator of the
EPA may impose more stringent water quality-based limitations on discharges if technology-based standards are inadequate. 33 U.S.c. § 1312.
257. See supra section ITA
258. See William F. Ford, Jr., Third Circuit RerJinq, Fundamentally Dilftrtnt Fador Van-
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301 (l) of the Clean Water Act, however, limits exceptions for point
sources discharging toxic pollutants to fundamentally different factors variances under subsection 301 (n).259 Adopted in 1987, subsection 301 (n) allows the Administrator, with the concurrence of
the relevant state, to modify national effluent guidelines or categorical pretreatment standards, which govern sources that discharge toxic pollutants into public1y-owned treatment works rather
than directly into navigable waters. Congress or the EPA should
consider establishing a fundamentally different factors variance for
sources of air toxics. A broader exception process, however, is
needed that takes into account a source's actual impact on ambient air quality.
The Supreme Court in EPA v. National Crushed Stone, held that
an individual firm's inability to comply with national effluent standards because of economic hardship, could not exempt that firm
from meeting minimum industry-wide standards. 260 From the standpoint of economic theory, "hardship" exceptions are inadvisable
because they reward a firm for being less efficient than other firms
in an industry.261 Because of the health hazards of air toxics, simple financial distress should not relieve sources of air toxics from
subsection 112(d)'s technology-based requirements or even the
more stringent residual risk requirements. There should, therefore, be no "hardship" exceptions for producers of air toxics.
Subsequent court decisions have established that fundamentally
different factors variances may not be issued based upon the
source's impact on water quality.262 Thus, a firm must demonstrate
engineering and technical constraints or compliance costs from
ames Under the Clean Water Act: Should They be Applicable to Toxic Pol/utants, 29 VILL. L REv.
771, 784-88 (1984) (discussing several variance and modification provisions under Clean
Water Act).
259. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(l), (n).
260. 449 U.S. 66, 72-85 (1980). In § 301 (c) of the Clean Water Act, Congress had
established a procedure for granting individual sources a modification from the timetables
for complying with more stringent "best available technology" effiuent standards, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311 (c), but there was evidence that Congress did not intend to allow similar modifications based upon an individual source's financial distress as a grounds for an exception
from complying with the "best practicable technology currently available" standards that
every firm had to meet or shut down. See National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 73-84.
261. From an economist's perspective, a variance for economic hardship (as opposed
to a cost-benefit analysis) makes no sense.
262. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council 470 U.S. 116, 132
(1985); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1982) (Appalachian 111);
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 454 U.S. 1053
(1981); Ford, supra note 258, at 791 n.89.
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engineering, technical or raw material requirements that are fundamentally different from other firms. 263
There is an internal logic to excluding water quality factors
from consideration in granting fundamentally different factors variances.264 A source's actual impact on air quality, however, ought
to be grounds for granting a "fairness" variance from subsection
112 (d)'s technology-based standards or subsection 112(£)'s
residual risk requirements. 265 A fairness exception is appropriate
where an individual firm's compliance with categorical standards
would result in no significant environmental benefit.266 A more
difficult question arises where compliance results in some reduction in risk, but there are disproportionately high costs in relationship to the benefits achieved. The issues surrounding a "fairness"
exception for sources of air toxies will be discussed below.
In Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Cou1Zci~267 the
Supreme Court explained that a source of water toxies seeking a
fundamentally different factors variance must prove that the EPA
should have placed the firm in a separate subcategory during the
rulemaking process.268 When this case was decided in 1985, subsection 301 (l) prohibited the Administrator from modifying any requirement applicable to toxic pollutants and did not yet contain
the exception for fundamentally different factors variances added
in 1987.269 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that
there was no clear congressional intent indicating whether fundamentally different factors variances were precluded under subsection 30l(l) and that the EPA's interpretation that fundamentally
263. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n 470 U.S., at 156 (Marshall. J •• dissenting); 40 C.F.R.
§ 403.13(d)(5); Latin. "Fine-Tuning", supm note 11, at 1315-16.
264. Appalachian Power Co., 671 F.2d at 809 ("Because receiving water quality is clearly
excluded in the setting of generic BPT [best practicable technology] limitations. it must
also be excluded in detennining whether to grant a variance from those general
limitations.
265. See text accompanying notes 293-95.
266. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n 470 U.S .• at 162 n. 21 (Marshall.J •• dissenting); Aman,
supra note 179. at 311-12.
267. 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Compare William Funk, The Exaptitm That A~ Ihe Ruk:
HJF Variances Under the Clean n~ AcI, 13 B.C. ENvn.. AFF. 1.. REv. 1 (1985) (criticizing
Chemical Mfrs. allowance of variances from toxic cffiucnt limitations. but arguing that case
will have little significance) with Elaine Eichlin Henninger. Note. ChaniC41 ManuJadurm
Association v. Nalural Resourre.s Defense Council, Inc.: Congrtssional AmbiguilJ Allows EPA ~ SaJd]
Valve 10 Remain Open, 35 CATH. U. 1.. REv. 595 (1986) (arguing Supreme Court correctly
deferred to EPA's statutoI)' interpretation allowing variances).
268. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.. 470 U.S. at 120-21.
269. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (I) (1988) with 33 U.s.c. § 1311 (I) (1984).
W

).
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different factors variances are not modifications as the term is used
in subsection 301 (l) was permissible. The court also found that in
the absence of clear congressional intent courts should defer to the
agency's interpretation of the statute and held that such variances
are therefore available to sources of toxic pollutants. 27o
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that the
EPA's interpretation of subsection 301 (l) was inconsistent with the
clear intent of Congress. 271 He acknowledged that the EPA has the
authority to establish a separate subcategory and effluent standards
for a single source discharging water toxics that is fundamentally
different from other sources in the original category or subcategory, but disagreed with the EPA's position that revision of the
standards through notice-and-comment rulemaking is substantially
equivalent to granting an fundamentally different factors variance
even if the procedure is somewhat different. 272 Justice Marshall argued that "Congress attached great substantive significance to the
method used for establishing pollution control requirements."273
He contended that having individual states or the EPA evaluate a
variance application for a single source was no substitute for evaluating whether there are similarly situated dischargers that deserve
their own subcategory.274 For example, the effluent standards for a
group of similarly situated dischargers in a new subcategory might
be significantly more stringent or more likely to spur technological
innovation than those set for a single source granted a fundamentally different factors variance. 275 Even if the statutory revision procedure resulted in the creation of a subcategory with only one
discharger, that procedure would at least establish that this discharger is uniquely situated whereas a variance procedure sets individual requirements even where there may be similarly situated
dischargers. 276
In the concluding section of his dissent,Justice Marshall argued
that Congress intended to prohibit any exceptions to the general
rules for water toxics. 277 He acknowledged that exceptions may
270. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 470 U.S. at 125-34.
271. Id. at 135-65.
272. See id. at 153-54 (Marshall,j., dissenting).
273. Id. at 154 (Marshal,]., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
274. Id at 156.
275. Id. at 157.
276. Id. at 158.
277. Id. at 159-65. justices Blackmun and Stevens joined his dissent, but justice
O'Connor "express[ed] no view as to Part IV of the dissent because I think it is not necessary to the disposition of these cases." Id. at 165 (O'Connor, j., dissenting).
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"mediate bet:\veen demands for comprehensive solutions on the
one hand, and individualized application of law on the other."278
He contended, however, that exceptions "are inappropriate where
small errors could lead to irreversible or catastrophic results" and
that Congress had clearly indicated that an exceptions process
would interfere with controlling toxic pollution.279 Thus, fundamentally different factors variances are prohibited as any other
type of "fairness" or "hardship" exception would be.280 On the
other hand, revision of existing categories and creation of new subcategories are appropriate "because they are rules of general
applicability."281
"Fairness" exceptions are preferable on both on equity and efficiency grounds. Prohibiting any exceptions and requiring revision
of categories through the rulemaking process would provide more
procedural and thus more substantive protections to the public,
but the EPA's delays in promulgating technology-based rules pursuant to subsection 112(d) despite firm congressional deadlines
suggests that rulemaking is too cumbersome. The majority in Chemical MJrs. Ass'n agreed with the agency that the availability of "variances makes bearable the enormous burden faced by EPA in
promulgating categories of sources and setting effiuent limitations."282 The administrative convenience of an exception process
out:\veighs the potential disadvantages suggested in Justice Marshall's dissent as long as appropriate safeguards are in place: allowing individual exceptions, but requiring a source in its variance
application to discuss whether there are similarly situated sources
and mandating that the EPA consider such information in determining whether to grant an individual exception and in setting the
appropriate standard for that source. Furthermore, citizens would
have the opportunity to challenge a source's assertion that it is
uniquely situated and would have the opportunity to obtain government grants to investigate whether other sources are similarly
situated. Nevertheless,Justice Marshall's dissent demonstrates that
procedural differences can have substantive consequences.
Despite the enormous litigation surrounding fundamentally dif278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 159 (citing Diver, Policy Making Paradigms, supra note 249).
Id. at 159-61.
See id. at 161-65.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 132.

HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 321 1994

322

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 13:263

ferent factors variances, the EPA has granted relatively few. 283 The
EPA should be able to grant exceptions not only for sources meeting the criteria for such variances, but also where the cost of regulation is clearly disproportionate to a source's actual impact on the
environment and the exception will not pose an unacceptable
health risk.
d. Ambient Quality "Fairness" Exceptions.
The Clean Water Act contains a water quality-related variance
in subsection 316(a) for sources demonstrating that thermal effluent limitations are "more stringent than necessary to assure the
pro[t]ection and propagation ofa balanced, indigenous population
of shellfish, fish, and wildlife ...."284 Subsection 301 (h) authorizes
a water quality-related exception for publicly owned treatment
works whose discharges do not interfere with attainment of the national water quality goal in marine waters in recognition of the
ocean's natural assimilative capacity.285 Professor Latin contends
that the EPA has granted too many exemptions under both provisions and that such exceptions produce negative overall policy results even if some sources genuinely deserve a variance. 286
The most interesting example of a water quality-related variance is contained in subsection 301 (g), which allows modifications
for certain nonconventional pollutants. 287 Nonconventional pollutants are all pollutants that are not classified either as conventional
or toxic pollutants. 288 Nonconventional pollutants are sometimes
referred to as "gray area" pollutants because some may be reclassi283. By 1984, the EPA had been granted a total of four fundamentally different factors variances to direct dischargers. and none to indirect dischargers. fd. at 124 n.12.
284. 33 U.S.C. § 1326; Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1320-21 (criticizing
wholesale exemptions EPA granted to thermal polluters).
285. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h); Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1321-22 (criticizing
excessive number of marine water exceptions).
286. See generaUy Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1320-23. Sometimes courts
required the agency to read an exception in an expansive manner. See, e.g. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting EPA's narrow interpretation of Clean Water Act § 301 (h».
287. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g).
288. fd. § 1311 (b) (2) (F). Conventional pollutants are those which were traditionally
regulated in discharges from publicly owned treatment works and include biochemical
oxygen demand, suspended solids, fecal coliform, pH, oil, and grease. WILUAM MURRAY
TABB & LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 454 (1992). See generally 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311 (b)(2)(E); 1314(b)(4)(A)-(B). Toxic pollutants are listed pursuant to requirements set forth in section 307 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1317.
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fied in the future as toxic pollutants.289 In 1987, Congress defined
"nonconventional" to include ammonia, chlorine, color, iron, and
total phenols, and also granted the EPA authority to list additional
pollutants.29o
Subsection 301(g) authorizes the EPA to grant a modification
of "best available technology" requirements for direct dischargers
of nonconventional pollutants that can demonstrate compliance
with minimal technology- or water quality-based standards in subsections 301 (b) (1) (A) or (C), that the modification will not result
in any additional requirements on any other point or nonpoint
source, and that the modification will not interfere 'with water quality-related standards.291 The petitioner must show that the modification will not interfere with public drinking water supplies,
recreational activities, or the protection and propagation of shellfish, fish, and wildlife.292 Furthermore, the owner or operator of
the point source must demonstrate that the modification will not
"pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment
because of bioaccumulation, persistency in the environment, acute
toxicity, chronic toxicity (including carcinogenicity, mutagenicity
or teratogenicity), or synergistic propensities."293
Congress should amend the Clean Air Act by establishing a fairness exception system for sources of air toxics where a source can
demonstrate that the cost of regulation disproportionately exceeds
the public health benefits provided the source can satisfy air quality-related criteria similar to those for water quality in subsection
301 (g) of the Clean Water Act 294 A major question is whether
fairness exceptions to the Clean Air Act should be applied to toxic
chemicals where great uncertainty exists of their health effects.295
Congress clearly excluded water toxics from the subsection 301 (g)
289. See generally JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS O. McGARrlY, THE L\w OF ENvtRON!>I£N.
269, 293, 322 (2d ed. 1992).
290. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 (g)(l) , (4). The version of§ 301 (g) adopted in 1977 had not
listed any particular chemicals as nonconventionals. 33 U.S.c. § 1311(g) (1978).
291. 33 U.S.c. § 1311(g)(2). Indirect dischargers into publicly o\\ned treatment
works are ineligible for a § 301(g} modification. Koppers Co., Inc. \'. EPA, 767 F.2d 57
(3rd Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
292. 33 U.S.c. § 1311 (g)(2}(C).
293. Id.
294. This author would probably favor expanding subsection 301 (g) to include water
toxies, but will not directly address whether the same arguments for fairness exceptions
apply to water toxies.
295. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying texL
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water quality-related variance program. 296 Similarly, because subsection 112(d)'s technology-based emission standards "shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of hazardous
air pollutants subject to this section (including a prohibition on
such emissions, when achievable) that the Administrator, taking
into consideration the cost [and other factors], determines is
achievable ... ", a strong argument can be made that sources of air
toxics are not entitled to a variance even if their residual risk is far
below one-in-one-million. 297
While fairness exceptions would pose some risk to the public
health, applicants for exceptions would have to demonstrate on a
site-specific basis that their pollution does not pose an unacceptable risk. Thus, this Article's proposed variance process would contain far more safeguards than the Bush administration's trading
scheme for sources in the early reductions program. 298 The following study demonstrates some powerful reasons for allowing more
regulatory flexibility despite the risks of toxic chemicals.
e.

The Amoco-EPA Study: The Case for Flexible Regulation.

A recent joint Amoco-EPA study of Amoco's Yorktown, Virginia
refinery sought to assess how well current environmental regulations and pollution control requirements work at an individual
source through extensive monitoring of actual emissions. The
study's findings demonstrated ways to reduce pollution at less cost
than is possible following current regulatory techniques. 299 The re296. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(4).
297. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2). There is no variance procedure from § 112's technology·based emission standards for individual sources of hazardous air pollutants. Under
§ 112(c)(9), however, a source category would not be subject to technology-based Siandards if no source in the category emits such hazardous pollutants in quantities that result
in a lifetime cancer risk of one-in-one-miIIion to the most exposed individual and emissions
from non-carcinogenic pollutants do not exceed air quality levels beyond those necessary
to protect the public health with an ample margin of safety. This deletion provision applies only to whole source categories and not to individual sources.
298. Possible changes to emission averaging policies may require sources engaged in
"trading" of hazardous air pollutants to conduct risk assessments that would be similar in
nature, although potentially more limited in scope, to the site-specific exposure assessments proposed in this Article. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
299. See generally AMoco, supra note 8; see also Keith Schneider, Unbending Rtgulalions
Incite M(JTJe to Alter Pollution Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, atAl, All (discussing Amoco/
EPA study); Caleb Solomon, Clearing the Air: What Rtally Pol/utes, WALL ST. j., March 29,
1993, at AI, A6 (same). The project took two years, cost $ 2.3 million, and produced
volumes of information on air, water and solid waste releases. AMoco supra note 8, at vi.
The study faced difficult problems in identifying, sampling and monitoring emissions from
thousands of valves, flanges, pump seals and tank vents. Id. at 1-4,1-5,1-16,1-17, B-1, B-2.
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finery was spending $31 million to rebuild the refinery's wastewater system to prevent benzene, an air toxic, from evaporating
into the air, but no controls were required at marine loading docks
that emitted far more pollution and could be controlled at far less
cost-just $6 million.soo The regulation requiring the cleanup of
benzene at refinery'S waste-'water treatment plants was based upon
1959 benzene emissions estimates from pools of dirty water known
as "separators" that the Yorktown study showed to be twenty times
less than the 1959 study predicted.sol Under current law, however,
there are no provisions that allow the EPA to exempt sources of
hazardous air pollutants from nationwide, uniform technologybased requirements even if alternative approaches to regulation
might be more efficient or result in less pollution.302 In particular,
the study pointed out that current administrative procedures discourage a coordinated approach to multimedia releases, including
the analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of managing residual pollutants in different media.sos The study recommends that incentives
be provided for conducting facility-wide assessments and developing multi-media release reduction strategies.304 The Amoco-EPA
study raises important questions concerning the EPA's authority to
exempt a particular facility from national pollution control standards if site-specific exposure modeling indicates there are alternative methods to reduce pollution at less cost or the e:lo..-pense of
regulation is disproportionate to the risk posed by a pollutant or
combination of pollutants.
There are good policy reasons to favor variances from technology-based standards despite Professor Latin's arguments and congressional intent to establish subsection 112(d) standards as a
minimum. Noncancer, multimedia and other potential impacts
may not be addressed until industry has an incentive to conduct
The EPA pointed out that samples were collected over a short period of time and therefore
represent a "snapshot" of releases to the environment at that time. Because of both practical and perhaps inherent uncertainties in risk assessments, the study could not establish
absolute risk levels or measure the ecological impact from airborne emissions, but focused
on the more narrow issue of measuring relative changes in risk from current lC'o'els on
human health effects indicated by changes in exposure to benzene. Id. at 1-1, 1-2, B-4.
300. See AMoco supra note 8, at viii, 1-7, 1-11, 1-12; Solomon, supra note 299, at Al.
A6. There was some disagreement between EPA and Amoco about some specific measurements and results, but both agreed wastewater is a small contributor to total benzene releases. AMoco, supra note 8, at 1-12.
301. See Schneider, supra note 299, at All; Solomon, supra note 299. at A6.
302. See AMoco supra, note 8, at ix, 1-12, 1-15, 1-16.
303. Id. at ix, 1-18.
304. Id. at 1-17, 1-18.
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site-specific facility-wide assessments and develop multi-media release reduction strategies. The EPA simply did not know about the
importance of benzene emissions from loading docks at Amoco's
Yorktown refinery until ajoint study was done. 805 Mter this study,
the EPA is considering new regulations to control benzene emissions at loading docks, but those regulations will not take effect for
a few years. 806 Meanwhile, Amoco continues to spend huge
amounts on controlling relatively small amounts of benzene emissions from wastewater, but allows benzene emissions from its loading docks to continue because there are no regulations. 807 The
Amoco-EPA study suggests that the whole approach to regulation
needs to be framed in terms of tailoring regulations to individual
plants.
IV.

LEGISLATING RESIDUAL RISK AND PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION STANDARDS

A.

"'When EPA Should Impose Mwe Restrictive Regulations on a
Facility

This Article proposes that Congress enact a "fuzzy bright line"
statute for regulating residual risk that would: (1) require the elimination of cancer risks greater than one-in-ten-thousand from any
pollutant or combination of pollutants; (2) would presumptively
allow industry variances from technology-based standards if cancer
risks are less than one-in-one-million and there are no other significant dangers from noncancer or multimedia risks, and (3) would
allow the agency limited discretion in regulating risks between
those figures in light of economic costs and technological feasibility. The proposed statute would require that the EPA or states hold
formal public hearings and prepare more detailed administrative
records than normally required for the Title V operating permit
program if a source applies for a variance from technology-based
standards. It would also allow the public to compel hearings on a
source's permit application or reapplication if they present evidence of significant risks from carcinogens, noncarcinogens, "hotspots," multimedia pollution, indirect effects, or potentially disparate impacts on diverse, exposed subpopulations.
The proposal raises important questions such as about the ex305. See Solomon, supra note 299, at A6.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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tent to which Congress should allow the EPA flexibility in exempting a source from technology-based standards if the source argues
it can achieve other reductions. The incommensurability of many
different types of risks suggests that Congress must define priorities
and constrain the agency's discretion by establishing ranges in
which the agency may operate. The difficult problems of assessing
risk raises questions about what types of exposure assessments are
appropriate to gather information. Must a source engage in actual
monitoring or simply rely on models? Congress could establish a
preference for actual monitoring, but give the agency some discretion in allowing modeling.
In addition to showing the shortcomings of the residual risk
provisions of subsection 112 (f), this Article has argued that public
participation in environmental decisionmaking is an important
policy consideration. In this section, this Article will discuss haw the
proposal would allow greater meaningful participation than the
current system. This section will briefly discuss under what circumstances the EPA should impose additional procedures, including
public hearings or site-specific exposure assessments, and especially more restrictive regulations on an individual facility when a
citizen alleges that national standards do not adequately protect
the public safety. It will also suggest how the EPA might implement an exceptions process that can impose more restrictive regulations on some firms while also allowing more lenient variances
from national standards in favor of other sources.
In determining whether to impose additional procedural requirements on a source when a citizen requests a public hearing or
a site-specific risk assessment, the EPA should consider the cost of
such procedures, but should err on the side of enhancing public
participation. In determining whether to impose more stringent
regulations on an individual source, the EPA should attempt to
compare the costs and benefits of regulation but err on the side of
public safety. The proposal would require the EPA or industry to
fund technical assistance grants to allow citizens to substantiate serious concerns about a facility's risk.
This Article would allow the agency to consider rapidly escalating costs that fail the "knee-of-the-cuIVe"g08 benefit-cost test in determining whether to grant a citizen's request for more restrictive
regulation of a particular facility than required by national stan308. See infra note 320 {discussing "knee-of.the-curyc" test}.

HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 327 1994

328

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 13:263

dards. 309 There are, however, important normative reasons to prevent potential environmental and health-related harm even if such
safeguards fail cost-benefit analysisSIO There are also reasons to
believe that the tort system may be inadequate to compensate all
potential victims.sll
The ultimate goal of Congress was to achieve maximum reductions for each hazardous air pollutant. Even the residual risk standards do not require the EPA or a major source to consider the
impact of individual pollutants. That omission would be fine if
each chemical caused the same disease and affected each exposed
subpopulation in the same way, but in fact different types of hazardous air pollutants can cause different diseases and can have a
greater or lesser impact on different subpopulations. Furthermore, there may be potential multiplicative or synergistic impacts
from different chemicals which increase the risk of cancer or other
diseases. 312 Site-specific exposure assessments of individual pollutants may produce benefits by producing information useful for
other regulatory programs or helping to develop more flexible regulatory approaches better suited to addressing multimedia
problems. sl3 This Article proposes to establish a presumption in
309. See generally Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 204-06 (5th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting industry challenge that EPA regulations failed "knee of curve" test).
310. Professors Shapiro and McGarity have argued that tough technology-based controls should be used even if those controls may fail a cost-benefit test because, for normative reasons, they would prefer to prevent injuries to the extent feasible, rather than
compensate for injuries after they occur. Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 80, at 751. They
also maintain, however, that cost-benefit analysts underestimate the value of a life and that
worker compensation systems pay workers less than the full economic value of their lives,
as defined by economists. Id.; see also VISCUSI, supra note 79, at 17-18 (loss of earnings does
not reflect full value of worker's life). Their arguments would apply even more powerfully
to neighbors of plants using such substances because their exposure is involunt.'lry and
because workers in at least some sense "volunteer" to work for a firm using high-risk chemicals and generally receive wage premium for such work. See VISCUSI, supra note 79, at 44;
Gillette & Krier, supra note 79, at 1071-86 (arguing that ordinary persons correctly consider
voluntary versus involuntary distinction in assessing acceptability of risk).
311. In another article, this author argued that firms using extremely hazardous
materials may not fully internalize those costs because of the possibility of filing for bankruptcy and that insurance requirements may not be adequate to force firms to internalize
fully such costs. See Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: "Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risll
Index Taxes, 53 OHIO STATE LJ. 761, 791-97 (1992). An even larger problem is the difficulty of proving causation in toxic tort suits. See, e.g., Applegate, Perils, supra note 22 , at 272
n.59; Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219 (1987).
312. In general, the EPA's risk assessment methods for hazardous air pollutants do
not take into account the possibility of synergistic and antagonistic effects of various pollutants. See Sawey et al., supra note 71, at 482.
313. The recent Amoco-EPA study indicates that individualized risk assessments can
yield benefits in identifying less expensive ways to achieve the same pollution reductions.
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favor of more restrictive regulation of individual plants if a citizen
can produce substantial evidence demonstrating that significant
risks from individual pollutants exist at a facility that are not addressed by existing national regulation and that the costs of additional regulation are not disproportionate to the expected
benefits.
There are a variety of ways that Congress might develop a "fuzzy
bright line" or risk range approach to regulation. This Article will
distinguish between the use of noncarcinogenic risk and other factors as either comparison factors or consideration factors. The
technology-based standards in the Clean Water Act distinguish between comparison factors that require the EPA to undertake a limited
balancing test in which the cost of technology-based controls are
compared against effluent reduction benefits, and consideration factors that the agency must simply "take into account."314 In determining "best practicable technology currently available" under the
Clean Water Act, the limited comparison factors balancing test requires the EPA "to limit the application of technology only where
the additional degree of effluent reduction is wlwUy out ofproportion
to the costs of achieving such marginal level of reduction for any
class or category of sources."315 By contrast, "Congress did not
mandate any particular structure's or weight for the many consideration factors," but merely "left EPA with discretion to decide how
to account for the consideration factors, and how much weight to
give each factor."316
This Article's proposal would require the EPA to undertake a
comprehensive cost-benefit comparison test whenever possible to
estimate the risk of granting an exception from national standards
where a firm contends that the costs of regulation at one of its
While the study was costly and difficult to perform, the EPA and Amoco identified ways to
achieve greater pollution reductions for about $11 million than are being achieved at a
cost of $41 million under current agency regulations. See AMOCO supra, note 8, at ,iii·ix, Ill, 1-23 (Table 1.3).
314. For example, pursuant to § 304(b) (1) (B) of the Clean Water Act. the £PAmusl
take into account both consideration and comparison factors in determining the best practicable technology currently available. 33 U.S.G. § 1314(b) (1) (B); Ste gmtralLJ Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d lOll, 1045-47 (D.G. Gir. 1978). By contrast, in § 304(b)(2)(B)
of the Clean Water Act all factors, including costs and benefits, are consideration factors,
and no factors are separated out for comparison in determining the best available technology economically achievable. 33 U.S.c. § 1314(b) (2) (B); n~'trlzaeustT, 590 F.2d at 1045.
315. WIlj'erluzeuser, 590 F.2d at 1045 n.52 (quoting SENATOR MU5K1£, A WISUTIVE
HlsroRY OF THE WATER POU.unON ComROL Ac:r AMENDMENTS OF 1972 170 (1973» (emphasis added by WIlj'erhaeuser court).
316. fd. at 1045.
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facilities are wholly disproportionate to health benefits achieved.
On the other hand, the EPA would have to assess whether additional regulations proposed by a citizen for a plant are reasonably
cost effective for the health benefits that would be gained. In some
cases, the EPA may have to apply a "consideration approach" in
which the agency simply takes into account health and cost factors
where there is insufficient information 'with which to assess the
risks of a chemical or the potential cost of reducing its emissions.
Because of the great uncertainties about the risks posed by many
hazardous air pollutants, this Article's proposal would allow the
EPA to err on the side of conservative health assumptions in determining whether the costs of technology-based or residual risk standards are wholly disproportionate to the costs of regulation at a
particular facility.
Congress might set some limits on the agency's balancing of
health and cost factors by specifying a list of factors that mayor
may not be considered. For example, a statute could simply require the EPA to consider noncarcinogens, indirect and multimedia impacts, impacts on diverse exposed subpopulations and
other "public" risk considerations. The advantage of such an approach is that no attempt would be made to assign arbitrary
weights to factors that are incommensurable. A simple "consideration" factor approach, however, may not give the EPA enough congressional guidance on how to weigh such factors.
On the other hand, Congress could require the EPA to balance
the cost and benefits of regulation within certain constraints. A
statute might mandate that the marginal cost of a decision to protect public health fall within a range, for instance, of five to fifty
million dollars per life saved, and establish criteria directing how
agencies should set the level of expenditure in specific rulemaking
contexts. 317 For example, Congress might compel expenditures at
the high end of the range if the maximum individual risk exceeded
a specific value, such as one-in-ten-thousand. 318 In the Superfund
program, the EPA uses a "point of departure" approach in which
risk managers seek to attain the smallest risk within the range,
which places a burden of proof on those advocating a more permissive risk within the risk range. 319 Congress could place a higher
317. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 336-38.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 319-20, 336-38; National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan,
55 Fed. Reg 8,666,8,715-18 (1990) [hereinafter Contingency Plan]. In an April 22, 1991
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burden of proof on applicants to the extent their variance proposals may create risks in the upper portion of the risk range. Applicants for variance proposals that have a greater overall excess
cancer risk would face a proportionately higher requirement to
prove that the variance would not disparately affect diverse subpopulations, create "hot spots," cause non-carcinogenic diseases, or
produce multi-media or indirect impacts.
Furthermore, Congress might enact a statute that requires each
source to reduce the risk of each noncarcinogen until "the ratio of
incremental cost to incremental risk reduction exceeds a specified
value."s2o The EPA would clearly have to exercise considerable
technocratic discretion in assessing the costs and benefits, for example, of regulating noncarcinogens or multimedia pollution.
Nevertheless, the value specified in the statute would provide some
congressional guidance to the agency. That value might be fairly
arbitrary, but it would bear the imprimatur oflegislative legitimacy.
That ratio might also constrain the EPA's consideration of costs
within the "fuzzy bright line" risk levels for carcinogens. Public
participation and judicial review could serve as limited checks in
determining whether the EPA's choices in a given variance proceeding are arbitrary or capricious.
A "fuzzy bright line" or risk range approach may encourage regulators to be more forthcoming about uncertainties in the risk assessment approach than they would under a single number
standard.s21 In addition, the use of a range that allows consideration of competing interests 'within the discretionary range might
encourage democratic dialogue about the realities of environmental decisionmaking.s22 On the other hand, the EPA may hesitate to
assign costs and benefits to risks such as birth defects or neurologiMemorandum from Don R. Clay, Assistant Administrator Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, to Directors of Regional Divisions, the EPA indicated a somewhat more
lenient approach by allowing a "no action" record of decision where a baseline risk assessment shows a risk less than one-in-10,OOO, but in some cases in which such an assessment
has indicated risks in the higher part of the risk range the EPA has initiated remedial
action to achieve a one-in·a-million remediation. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 319-20.
The EPA is most likely to adopt a one-in-a-million approach when cleanup costs are low or
when population density suggests potentially high incidence of disease. ld. at 320.
320. See Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 347. The familiar notion of the knee-of.thecurve, the point on the cost curve where costs begin to escalate dramatically. may pro\ide
an attractive starting point for answering the difficult question of how much expense on
risk reduction is "too much." See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 80, at 743.
321. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 338.
322. Id. at 356.
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cal damage. Imperfect regulation of such risks, however, is better
than none.
B.

"Fuzzy Bright Lines"
1.

Current Use of "Fuzzy Bright Lines. "

Legislators could mandate minimal standards but specify a
range of numeric values within which regulators could exercise discretion, so called "fuzzy bright lines."323 For example, a statute
might permit an agency to set standards from lifetime cancer risk
from carcinogens between one-in-ten-thousand and one-in-a-million. 324 During congressional discussions on the Amendments, a
group of moderate Democrats, led by Representative Tauzi, advocated such a risk range and referred to this approach informally as
a "fuzzy bright line."325 Risk managers in several EPA program offices already use such ranges to guide their decisions, without statutory directives. 326 In addition, the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection's Division of Environmental Quality considers risks less than one-in-a-million to be negligible, risks greater
than one-in-ten-thousand to be unacceptable, and judges risks between these limits on a case-by-case basis. 327
A risk range allows government agencies to balance a number
of factors when setting standards within the permissible range of
risk. 328 The disadvantage of the "fuzzy bright line" approach compared to a "bright line" or "rules" requirement is that a risk range
may give the agency as much discretion as a narrative standard
such as an "ample margin of safety" and therefore allow residual
risk to cluster at the high end of the risk range. 329 Every type of
statute can potentially be manipulated or ignored by an agency.
The more discretionary a statute, however, the easier it is for a con323. Id. at 336-38, 361.
324. Id. at 336.
325. Id. at 336-37.
326. Id. at 337. For example, EPA's Office of Solid Waste in selecting among cleanup
alternatives for corrective actions at active waste sites seeks to reduce risks into the one-in10,000 to one-in-a-million range. Id. at 315-16; Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Units (SWMU's) at Hazardous Waste Facilities, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,798, 30,825-27
(1990). The National Contingency Plan for the Superfund program states that remedies
must generally reduce the threat from lifetime cancer risk to a highly exposed individual, a
reasonable worst case, to within or below the range of one-in-l0,000 to one-in-a-million.
Contingency Plan, supra note 319, at 8,718-23, 8,768.
327. Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 337.
328. Id. at 337.
329. See id.
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gressional oversight committee or court to point out flagrant
abuses by an agency. To a certain extent, one must rely upon the
good faith of an agency in carrying out the statute. If Congress
desires to achieve a particular goal and wants the agency to carry
out congressional wishes, it is wise for Congress to explicitly require that the agency make efforts to achieve that goal.
2.

Incommensurability and "Fuzzy Bright Lines. n

a. Scientific Uncertainty.
Cancer research cannot always specify the risk of a chemical
even within a range of two orders of magnitude, a factor of 100.350
The difficulties in assessing the true range of risk may be even
greater under this Article's proposal to include a broader range of
factors than carcinogenicity, such as noncarcinogens, indirect and
multimedia effects, and impacts on diverse exposed subpopulations. It is more difficult to establish even "fuzzy bright line" values
for noncarcinogens that cause birth defects, reproductive failure,
acute poisonings, neurological defects and other diseases. In fact,
many argue that it is impossible to compare such chemicals with
each other or 'with carcinogens. These scientific ambiguities raise
profound questions as to whether there is any legislative metric
that can address such problems.
One simplistic solution to the problem of incommensurability
would be to require that the EPA simply rank the relative risk of
both carcinogen~ and noncarcinogens on a single risk index. The
EPA has already done this for its emissions averaging scheme for
the early reductions program. That risk index, however, is based
on a series of arbitrary assumptions. There needs to be better scientific evidence about both carcinogens and non carcinogens
before an adequate risk index could be constructed, and even then
there would be profound questions about commensurability.ssl
330. fd. at 338.
331. In another article, however, this author advocated a "toxic death risk index taxdesigned to force firms to internalize fully the costs of an accidental release despite the
possibility of using the federal bankruptcy laws to avoid paying full costs. &e generally,
Mank, Preventing Bhopal, supra note 311, at 762, 791-804. That article recognized that some
risks, especially long·term ones, are too uncertain to quantify, but maintained that it might
be possible to base a tax and risk index upon established risks, especially short·term ones.
fd. The lack of adequate scientific evidence that plagued the EPA in constructing its risk
index for the emissions averaging component of the early reductions program suggests
that constructing a risk index that considers the risks of a l\ide variety of carcinogens and
noncarcinogens is beyond present scientific knowledge. Risk indexes may be useful in
prioritizing which risks the EPA or other agencies should study gil-en limited resources, but
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Some environmentalists would undoubtedly favor legislation
mandating rigorous emission standards for both carcinogens and
noncarcinogens without any possibility of variances or tradeoffs between regulation of different types of chemicals. There are many
reasons to support the "public" approach to risk assessment, especially its proponents' argument that chemicals causing different
diseases are incommensurable. Nevertheless, the Amoco-EPA
study suggests that agency expertise is limited, and that the public
safety can be enhanced where industry has an incentive to increase
regulation of certain chemicals or types of operations in exchange
for more lenient regulation in other respects. In the absence of
industry incentives and variances, Congress or the EPA may simply
not regulate certain types of risk, such as those posed by noncarcinogens, and therefore the public safety may benefit from this Article's proposal.
At some point, tradeoffs must be made between acknowledging
scientific uncertainty and providing legislative direction through a
common metric. Public participation both through the legislative
process and public hearings are means to legitimate those tradeoffs
in a way that the exercise of agency discretion and expertise
cannot.
Another approach would give the EPA discretion to regulate
noncarcinogens as the agency sees fit. Arguably, subsection 112(f)
currently gives the EPA such discretion in determining what is an
"ample margin of safety." The failure of that approach before 1990,
however, raises serious concerns about how effectively the agency
will address residual risk issues once technology-based controls are
in place.
This Article proposes an approach that would acknowledge the
considerable uncertainty about the risks of many chemicals, and
suggests that the EPA must exercise at least some discretion in evaluating risks at individual sites. On the other hand, Congress would
establish a clear priority that the risks of noncarcinogens and other
risk factors must be addressed in the EPA's residual risk program.
b.

Site-Specific Exposure Assessments.

Site-specific exposure assessments are potentially explosive.
The Amoco-EPA project took two years, and cost $ 2.3 million.
risk indexes seem ilI-suited at present to selVe as the primary basis for regulating residual
risk. See generally Applegate. Wtmt Things. supra note 22. at 325-27 & passim (discussing use
of risk indexes to set priorities).
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However, it produced volumes of information on air, water, and
solid waste releases. 332 In some cases, where a major source requests significant regulatory variances or where a citizen group
demonstrates substantial pollution problems, a detailed and sitespecific, facility-wide study similar to the Amoco-EPA study may be
justified. In many cases, however, the potential risk will not justify
such assessment.
This Article suggests ways to reduce costs. First, the proposed
statute could provide a formula or guidelines for determining if
individualized risk-based assessments are too costly in a particular
case. Congress through the statute or the EPA through the
rulemaking process could set de minimis levels for triggering individualized testing that would reduce the number of sources affected by this Article's proposal.333 Second, the EPA might allow a
variance even without a risk assessment if a source makes other
substantial reductions not othenvise required by law that are
clearly of more value with regards to public safety.
An important issue is whether the Article's proposal should require actual monitoring of data from a source's emissions or simply
rely on less expensive predictive models.334 In practice, risk assessors usually use a combination of monitoring and models.sss Even
when an agency knows a source's emissions, it is still necessary to
make assumptions about how many people are actually ex-posed
and at what concentrations.3SG While monitoring is generally pref332. AMoco supra note 8, at vi.
333. Subsection 112(a)(5) defines "modification" to exclude de minimis changes. 42
U.S.c. § 7412(a) (5). Congress, under this proposal, or the EPA through regulations could
use the definition of de minimis found in that subsection or similar such measures to establish de minimis levels for determining when a source must conduct an indhidualizc:d risk
assessment in order to justify a trade.
334. The EPA generally uses predictive models, such as the Human Exposure Model,
rather than direct measurements to calculate the exposure of the maximally exposed individual. Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 291. The agency normally assumes that exposure
to a pollutant occurs over 70 years. Some commentators have criticized that assumption as
overly conservative because no one spends her entire life outdoors at the fenceline of a
factory, and because few factories produce the same products or C\'en exist for SC\'Cnty
years. See Bernard Goldstein, The Maxit1Ullly Exposed Individual: An Inappropriate Ba.sis lor
Public Health Decisionmaking, ENVIL. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 13. But sa Katherine Kaufman, In Defense althe Maxit1Ullly Exposed Individual, ENVIL. FORUM, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 50.
335. Assessors usually use a combination of direct ambient level measurements of a
compound and, for known sources and emission rates, ambient level modeling. Rosenthal
et aI., supra note 7, at 292.
336. The population risk estimate is more difficult to quantify than the maximum
individual risk because the assessor needs to know how many people are exposed to the
contaminant, at what levels of concentration, and for what periods of time. Rosenthal et
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erable,337 models have been extensively used to predict site-specific
concentrations for both criteria and hazardous air pollutants. 33s
Some researchers have questioned the reliability of exposure assessments based upon models. They argue that such models need
to be validated by measurements of internal doses in persons or
animals actually exposed. 339
Absent hard data, exposure assessments make assumptions
about the amount of water the average person drinks, the amount
of air that everyone in the population breathes, and about the population's food intake based upon market basket or national consumption surveys.340 These assumptions usually do not account for
the heterogeneity of the population, including gender differences,
age differences, socioeconomic differences, and lifestyle differences. 341 These shortcomings create uncertainties that sometimes
produce large overestimates of exposure, especially for estimates of
aI., supra note 7, at 291. While consumers and farm workers receive differing exposures
and while toxic substances are more likely to situate in minority communities, risk assessors
usually assume that a certain quantity of a carcinogen will produce the same increment.11
increase in cancer risk for any person. See id.
337. Researchers prefer detailed monitoring of a pollutant to modeling. Monitoring,
however, is expensive, cumbersome, requires actual releases of toxic compounds into the
environment and does not prove that a compound will behave similarly in other environ·
ments. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 292; see generally NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HUMAN ExPOSURE AssESSMENT FOR AIRBORNE POLLUTANTS:
ADVANCES AND OpPORTUNmES (1991). Still, monitoring may produce information other·
wise impossible to attain and monitoring also helps prevent cheating by sources. See generally Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in PUBUC POUCIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 245-72 (Paul R. Portneyed. 1990). There is general agreement that the EPA
in the past has done a relatively poor job of monitoring air emissions. See generally Russell,
supra (arguing that the EPA should conduct more and better ambient air quality monitor·
ing to allow society to assess whether federal pollution control laws are effective).
338. The EPA has stated that the technical basis for determining the impacts on
human health and the environment from various sources of air pollution will be improved
under a final rule issued by the agency on July 23, 1993 which will add new models and
upgrade existing models. New, Upgraded Models Will Improve Basis for Determining Health Ef
feets, EPA Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 515,515-16 Guly 23, 1993) [hereinafter New, Upgraded

Models}.
339. Exposure Assessments Based on Models Not Always Sound Predictors, Scientist Warns, 22
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1949, 1949 (Dec. 6, 1991) (reporting speech by Larry Needham, chief of
the Centers for Disease Control's Toxicology'S Branch).
340. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 292·93.
341. See id. at 293. The EPA is aware of, and attempts to account for, some variations
in individual consumption. In light of Executive Order 12898, which requires federal
agencies to consider environmental justice issues, EPA Administrator Browner has stated
that the agency would evaluate fish consumption on Indian reservations, where fish may
represent a larger portion of the daily diet than is reflected in federal standards. Pollution
Exposure Targeted: Protection of Poor, Minorities Ordered, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 12, 1993,
atA3.
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the most exposed individuals.342 In other cases, serious underestimates may result. 343
This Article's proposal would expand on the existing residual
risk provisions in subsection 112 (f) (2) (A), which already requires
exposure assessments.344 The statute requires that the EPA determine whether excess cancer risks at individual major sources of air
toxies exceed one-in-one-million for the most exposed individual
after technology-based controls are installed.345 The statute, however, does not specify what method the agency may use to make
that assessment.346 In addition, subsection 112(r) (7) (B) requires
the EPA to issue regulations mandating that users of threshold
amounts of certain listed hazardous substances prepare and implement a risk management plan that includes a hazard assessment to
determine the potential impact of an accidental release of any
listed substance.347 Neither statute, however, provides sufficient
Congressional guidance to the EPA regarding what types of information an exposure assessment should collect and how the agency
should evaluate that information.
Both monitoring actual emissions and modeling ambient levels
can provide useful information. Because there are often complex
technical considerations in determining the best approach for a
certain situation, Congress should allow discretion.348 Nevertheless, Congress might establish a goal of monitoring actual emissions whenever it is cost-effective.349 Variations in human exposure
pose even greater problems for both congressional control and risk
managers in the EPA A fuzzy bright line statute could require
342. Neil C. Hawkins, Conservatism in Maximally Exposed Individual (MEl) Prtdidiue Ex·
posure Assessments: A Fzrst-Cul Analysis, 14 REG. ToXlcolOC'l & PHAAMACOLOC\' 107, 116
(1991) (exposure estimates often overestimate risk, especially for most exposed
individual).
343. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 293 (discussing impact of heterogeneity on
exposure estimates).
344.. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2)(A).
345. Id.
346. See id.
347. 42 U.S.c. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii}; Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accident Release Prevention, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,190 (OCL 20, 1993).
348. See generally Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 348-53 (arguing Congress lacks technical expertise to prescribe risk assessment techniques and that bright line rules might
freeze scientific progress in risk assessment).
349. A number of environmental statutes require monitoring, but they rarely require
continuous monitoring. See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(b) (·continuous emissions monitoring
need not be required if alternative methods arc available that provide sufficiently reliable
and timely information for determining compliance.").
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heightened attention to the problems of heterogeneity in proportion to the overall risk from a pollutant or a source's overall
emissions.

3.

Public Participation.

In a major study sponsored by the Conservation Foundation,
Richard Liroff has argued that public participation, especially by
the Natural Resources Defense Council,350 has been vitally important in alerting regulators to questionable calculations by industries proposing bubbles for criteria pollutants. 35t Professor Latin
has argued that lack of public participation is a major failing of
most variance procedures for polluters as well as ordinary zoning
variance matters. 352 This Article contends that special measures
are necessary to insure adequate public participation in the proposed variance procedures for sources that contend that technology-based regulation of hazardous air pollutants is unnecessarily
strict.
This Article proposes following the special measures enumerated below to insure the adequate public participation needed to
better regulate hazardous air pollutants.
a.

Right to a Public Hearing Established.

EPA or a designated state agency should be mandated to grant
and hold a public hearing upon request in the following instances:
1) when a major source requests a variance from technology-based
standards in subsection 112; 2) when a major source of hazardous
air pollutants files a permit application; 3) a citizen group raises a
substantial issue as to whether a major source's operations would
pose substantial, carcinogenic, toxic (noncarcinogenic), multi-me350. Mary Nichols, fonnerly an attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council, is
currently the Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, the crucial position for establishing policies on air emissions. She may have a major impact in reevaluating the agency's
emission averaging policies for air toxies.
351. LIROFF, supra note 121, at xvii, 101. The amount of public participation involved
in bubble applications for criteria pollutants depends in part on the types of procedures
used. The state implementation plan revision process generally provides greater opportunities for public participation than state generic regulations, although the EPA has tuken
steps to narrow the gap. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Principles for
Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,816,
43,824, 43,835 (1986) [hereinafter Emissions Trading Policy Statement] (EPA promises
more oversight in state's public notice and comment process for generic bubble
applications) .
352. See Latin, "Fine-tuning", supra note 11, at 1323.
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dia, or disparate "hot-spot" type impacts. A citizen group would
not be able to challenge an agency's failure to grant or hold a public hearing absent a showing that a source poses a substantial risk.
In line with the Supreme Court's holding in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Counci~sss a citizen has some
burden to articulate issues when demanding costly allocation of
agency resources. A citizen may not simply raise a list of objections
and demand action.
b. Type of Hearing Required.
EPA and state agencies may have legitimate reasons for encouraging more informal hearingss54 even if the applicable statute entitles citizens to the right to a formal process; they may recognize
that formal adjudicatory hearings can be costly and time consuming. This article proposes a requirement for formal hearings where
1) a source requests a variance from technology-based standards,
2) the source's excess cancer risk exceeds one-in-one-million, or 3)
there are other significant risk factors.
The policy of encouraging citizens to elect informal hearings,
can be achieved through creating a lower burden on citizens requesting such informal hearings. This lower burden would apply
to the requirement of showing that a source poses a substantial risk
even after technology-based standards were in place.
This Article's proposal for formal public hearings where a
source seeks a variance or a citizen raises substantial issues about
the risks at an individual source would simply give citizens the same
353. 435 u.s. 519 (1978).
354. This Article's proposal must be understood in light of the operating permit rules
that apply to public participation. The rules provide for a thirty·day public comment period, and an opportunity for an informal public hearing, with the state providing notice of
the hearing at least thirty days in advance. Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32250,
32309 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 70.7(h). In contrast to the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit program, which requires fonnal adjudicatory
hearings, See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977) (formal adjudicatory
hearing under Administrative Procedure Act required for issuance of NPDES permit); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978) (same); 1 FRANK GRAD,
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 3-234.6 to 3-237, an air permit hearing need not include
trial-type procedures such as cross-examination of witnesses. Ste Operating Permit Program, 56 Fed. Reg.21712, 21742-43 (1991): David P. Novello, 17Ie Nr:w Cltan Air Ad Dptrating Permit Program: EPA:S Final Rules, EnvtI. L. Rep (EnvtI L. InsL) 10,080, 10,089 (1993).
Likewise, section 3008(h} of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act does not require
formal "on the record" hearings. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.d
1477 (D.C. Gir. 1989). Because formal adjudicatory hearings can be very expensh·e, most
states will probably elect to hold informal hearings instead. Ste Novello, supra, at 10089.
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rights as they have under the Clean Water Act's permit application
process; however, these rights would be greater than those provided under the EPA's new rules for Clean Air Act permits.
Clearly, the Bush administration sought less formal procedures for
permit hearings under the Amendments as a way to reduce costs
and to shorten hearings. While faster and cheaper hearings are
appropriate when risks are relatively low, high risks demand formal
hearings to allow for more careful consideration of scientific models and risk assessment assumptions.
c.

Regulations requiring states to prepare detailed fact sheets;
grants for technical assistance.

This Article argues that citizens who lack resources to research
well grounded concerns about a sources hazardous air emissions,
should not bear the full burden of developing issues without government assistance. This article proposes the following: (1) EPA
must issue regulations requiring states to prepare a detailed fact
sheet when a source seeks a variance, or when an interested citizen
raises substantial risk issues and (2) EPA must provide grants for
technical assistance to any group of individuals deemed threatened
by significant exposure from a facility's toxic air emissions. 3ss Such
grants would encourage citizen access in the early stages of decision making. They would allow greater opportunities for citizens
to challenge the substantive assumptions in an application, and not
rely solely on the more common procedural challenges which seek
to kill projects using delay tacticS. 356 Congress adopted a similar
policy to encourage public participation by citizens who may be
affected by toxic releases from Superfund sites. 357 Congress might
355. There are several alternative models of citizen involvement including: a statefunded public interest law firm; the Interstate Commerce Commission Office of Public
Counsel; the California private attorney general program; the EPA's Ombudsman concept;
institutionalized alternative dispute resolution; negotiated rule-making; citizens boards as
regulatory agencies; and a local citizens advisory committee. See generally Bruce Comly
French, MoreEJJective Citizen Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 24 U. TOL. L. REv.
389, 391415 (1993). Providing funds to citizen groups so they can challenge applicant
assumptions during permit hearings appears to be the most direct approach to correct
informational biases that favor applicants.
356. Id. at 390, 420 (arguing applicant should fund expense of information
collection) .
357. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (e); Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Superfund Cleanup
Process, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173, 194-95 (1991). Both the General Accounting Office and the
private National Commission on Superfund have recently issued reports suggesting how to
improve community involvement in the superfund process that might prove helpful In
designing a public participation for hazardous air pollutants. See generally NATIONAL COM.
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even require industry applicants to fund technical grants to citizen
groupS.358
This Article's proposals for more public participation would reverse certain policies on operational tlexibilitf59 and minor permit
MISSION ON SUPERFUND, FINAL CoNSENSUS REPoRT OF ruE NAnONAL CoMMISSION ON
SUPERFUND 43-46 (Pre-publication draft Dec. 21, 1993) (arguing inflexible limits on technical assistance grants are inappropriate and grants should reflect site's complexity); AgenCJ
Slwuld Solicit Public Input Earlier, Make InfonnalUm More Aaessihle, GAO Says, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2096, 2096-97 (Apr. 15, 1994) (discussing GAO, EPA's CoMMUNIlY RElAnoNS
CoULD BE MOREEFFECIlVE (Apr. 12, 1994) (arguing EPA's superfund community relations
program is generally effective, but that agency should do more to increase public
involvement) ).
In the early reductions rule, the EPA adopted the one-in·ten·thousand presumptive
risk benchmark used in the 1989 Benzene Standard, supra note 57. at 38.04546, and argued that the agency does not have to implement the one-in-million standard until
residual risk provisions take effect. See Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92, at 61.981-82.
The EPA could use this one-in-one-million standard to determine eligibility for grants.
The Act does provide grants to air pollution control agencies. but providing assistance to
citizen groups is a different issue. See 42 U.S.c. § 74.05 (grants to air pol\ution control
agencies). The Amendments established reward provisions up to $10.000 for citizens who
report violations of the Act that lead to a criminal conviction or civil penalty and this
system may provide some incentives for citizens to report violations of permit limits. but
would not address the larger issue of encouraging public participation in permit hearings.
See 42 U.S.c. § 7413(f); Public Participation Prouision Could Tum Pmnilling Proass Into
'Nzght71WTt, , Lawyer Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1283 (Aug. 28, 1992) (industry attorney complains that rewards could result in overly zealous enforcement).
358. See French, supra note 355. at 390. 420 (arguing applicant should fund expense
of information collection).
359. Section 502(b)(10) of the Act a1\ows certain facility changes \\ithout a permit
revision if the changes "do not exceed the emissions allowable under the permit." 42
U.S.c. § 7661a(b) (10). The congressional compromises used to reach agreement on this
provision make its meaning "difficult, if not impossible to decipher." Novel\o, supra note
354, at 10090. The EPA has taken a complex and somewhat confusing middle position
between environmentalists and states on the one hand and industry on tlle other in interpreting the operational flexibility statute. The EPA rejected the \;ew that § 502(b) (10) is a
mandate only to include alternate permitted scenarios in the permit because the agency
contended that such a narrow interpretation would render the section Mmere surplusage or
an unnecessary gloss on a source's obligation under section 502(a) to comply \\ith its permit." Operating Permit Program, supra note 254. at 32,267. On the other hand. the
agency disagreed with some industry commentators who contended that they could average "all emissions across the 'permitted facility' regardless of whether such averaging
would be consistent with the underlying requirements of the Act." Id. For exantple. a facility could not average emissions if a state implementation plan set an emissions limit at each
emissions unit at a facility, and averaging would result in a violation of any such emission
limit. Id. The EPA stated that emissions averaging provisions often required careful re\iew
to determine whether the trading plan meets all applicable requirements. and that the
seven-day notice provision in § 502(b) (10) "is not a reasonable amount of time to conduct
such a review." Id. On the other hand, the agency stated that "one policy goal of the Act is
to encourage responsible emissions trading plans and to reduce tlle costs of meeting the
Act's requirements." Id. Accordingly. tlle EPA promulgated implementing regulations for
§ 502(b) (10) "designed to encourage emissions trading as extensively as possible consis-

HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 341 1994

342

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 13:263

modifications36o adopted by the EPA during the Bush Administration. 361 This Article's proposed technical assistance grants are espetent with the requirement that title V permits comply with the applicable requirements of
the Act and the need to ensure a reasonable review of the emissions trading provisions
established in a permitting process." Id. The regulations allow a source to trade emissions
within the permitted facility to meet its state implementation plan limits, where the permit
does not already provide for such emissions trading but the plan does. Id. (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R § 70.4(b) (12) (ii». The regulations also require states to allow emissions trading where a source is under a federal emissions cap that is lower than any required under
the state implementation plan or other requirements, but such a source would still have to
comply with the plan. Id. at 32,268-69 (discussing 40 C.F.R § 7.4(b)(12(iii». The EPA
observed, however, that no plan currently allows sources to opt into an emissions trade
based upon a seven-day notice. Id. at 32268. The agency stated that it would encourage
states to develop such provisions "as part ofits efforts to promote market·based regulation
under the Act," and would issue final guidance by 1994. Id. at 32,268.
360. One of the most controversial parts of the permit regulations are the provisions
for minor permit modifications, which do not require public participation nor preclude a
source from acting on its application for a modification. See Operating Permit Program,
supra note 354, at 32,281-88. These two aspects of the proposed rule provoked a m'1ior
battle between the EPA, led by then Administrator William K. Reilly, who believed that they
were illegal, and the Council on Competitiveness, chaired by then Vice President Dan
Quayle, which argued that the provisions were legal and would provide substantial savings
to industry. White House, EPA Officials to Meet Soon to Rewrite Pennit Rule According 10 Bush
Order, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 428, 428-29 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter While House]. The
EPA's then General Counsel, Professor Donald Elliott, argued in an internal opinion,
which was later leaked and inserted into the rulemaking docket as attachments to comments by David Hawkins of the Natural Resources Defense Council, that the EPA's May
1991 proposal was illegal, but the Department of justice sharply disagreed with Elliott's
reasoning and defended the legality of the minor permit modifications. See Novello, supra
note 354, at 10090-91;justice Department Opinion on Legality of Comment Provisions of
Proposed Clean Air Act Regulations Related to Air Permitting Revisions Comment Period
With Accompanying Memorandum, Memorandum for William K. Reilly, Administrator of
EPA, from Barry M. Hartman, Acting Assistant General, Department of justice, May 27,
1992, reprinted in 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 624, 624-640 Uune 5, 1992). In the end, President
Bush had to personally resolve this dispute and decided in favor of their legality despite the
EPA's objections. Novello, supra note 354, at 10,091; White House, supra, at 428-29.
Under the regulations, states may adopt minor modification provisions, under which a
source need not obtain a permit revision if a change does not rise to the level of a modification under any provision of Title I of the Act or involve significant changes to applicable
requirements. See Operating Permit Program, supra note 354, at 32,280, 32,287-89 (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R § 70.7(e)(1), (e)(2)(i), (e)(4». A source may make its changes as
soon as it files an application, and need not notify the public. See id. The EPA has 45 days
to veto an application. [d. A state should issue or deny the revision within 90 days after
receiving the application and need not request public comment or hold a public hearing.
Id.

361. A fundamental problem with the operational flexibility regulations is that they
do not even discuss emissions averaging of air toxies, which are independent of any state
implementation plan. Because of their hazardous nature, the EPA should exclude air toxies from the seven-day notice requirements of § 502(b)(1O),s operational flexibility requirements. Furthermore, the EPA should adopt regulations prohibiting the use of the
operational flexibility provisions for sources seeking to average emissions of air toxies.
This Article contends that the minor modification provisions are especially inappre-
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cially intended to assist citizens from poor or minority
neighborhoods, who are disproportionately likely to live near undesirable land uses. The danger arises, however, that wealthier and
better educated citizens will disproportionately take advantage of
such grants to block the siting of facilities emitting air toxies and
that such grants could exacerbate the tendency of such sources to
locate in poor and minority neighborhoods.SG2 The most practical
solution would require that the EPA monitor this issue and encourage applications from poor or minority groups.
While this Article proposes that Congress or the EPA adopt the
proposals for site-specific exposure assessments and expanded public participation, states could choose to adopt such requirements if
there is a lack of federalleadership.SGS

v.

CONCLUSION

The residual risk provisions in subsection 112(£) of the Clean
Air Act fail to: safeguard against "hot-spots,n adequately compare
carcinogens and noncarcinogens, consider indirect or multimedia
impacts, or protect all the different discrete population groups surrounding a facility. At its core, subsection 112(£)'s residual risk
provisions do not provide the agency with adequate guidance on
priate for sources of air toxies because the definition of modification is more liberal under
§ 112. Section 112(a)(4)'s definition of modification for sources of air toxies excludes de
minimis changes whereas § 111 (a)(4)'s definition for sources of criteria pollutants applies
to any physical change. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7412{a)(4) (more than de minimis amount
required) wi1h 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a)(4). More importantly, § 112(g) allows a sourcc to usc
offsetting of different air toxies to avoid being classified as a modified source, although one
might read the provision to exclude trading among pollutants that cause different diseases.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g). Thus, it may be easier for sources of hazardous pollutants to qualify for a minor permit modification than sources of criteria pollutants, an outcome that
makes no sense given the greater toxicity of such chemicals.
This Article argues that the EPA should exclude air toxies from the minor modifi~
tion provisions because there is a greater need for public comment on these more dangerous pollutants. If the EPA fails to make this change, states should exercise their discretion
to impose such restrictions. See Novello, supra note 354, at 10,092 (states may adopt additional requirements).
362. Commentators argue that Gfaimessw attains through "progn:ssh'c siting- i.e. advantaged neighborhoods to bear more of the burden of undesirablc local land uses. Sa
Been, supra note 123, at 1047-52. It is difficult in a free-market society (or, indeed, any
society) to force such equal allocation of society's burdens. A progn:ssh'c siting schemc
might hurt everyone by making it difficult to site necessary but unpleasant facilities. Id. at
1050-52.
363. Under § 116 of the Act, states generally retain the authority to adopt more stringent standards and § 112(l) implicitly recognizes provisions for adopting state programs to
implement and enforce emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants. Sa grncrally 42
U.S.c. §§ 7412(l), 7416.
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how to adopt a second round of emissions standards if a source in a
category poses an excess cancer risk greater than one-in-one-million after technology-based controls are in place. For these reasons, Congress needs to amend subsection 112(f) to rectify these
deficiencies and to enact more comprehensive amendments to the
residual risk statute.
Congress should enact a statute allowing a source to obtain a
variance from technology-based requirements where the risk is
clearly low relative to the costs of compliance or where there are
alternative methods to significantly reduce pollution in a cost effective manner. In turn, a source applying for a variance would be
required to conduct a site-specific exposure assessment of each significant pollutant emitted, with possible de minimis provisions or
allowance for alternative risk assessment methods if the marginal
cost exceeds a certain limit or the "knee-of-the-curve" test.
In addition, private citizens would have the right to demand a
public hearing on a source's permit application, as well as a sitespecific exposure assessment upon introduction of substantial evidence of risk left unaddressed by the technology-based emission
standards and existing residual risk emission standards. The EPA
could provide technical assistance grants to help citizens develop
the requisite substantial evidence of such risks. The EPA could impose more stringent emission standards in response.
This Article's proposal for more and less stringent individualized emission standards for sources raises questions about nondelegation and due process issues. The proposed statute would use a
"fuzzy bright line" or risk range approach to give clearer congressional guidance to the EPA while at the same time preserving a
considerable amount of the agency's technocratic discretion. The
statute would provide a risk range of one-in-ten-thousand to one-ina-million. Risks greater than one-in-ten-thousand would be presumptively unacceptable. There would be a presumption in favor
of a variance if a risk were clearly less than one-in-one-million and
there are no other significant risk factors. There would be a
greater burden on applicants to justify variances the higher a
source fell in the range of risk. The higher the risk, the higher the
burden on the applicant to address issues such as multimedia and
indirect impacts, "hot-spots," noncarcinogens, and disparate impacts on diverse exposed subpopulations. The EPA would have
limited authority to consider cost in determining whether to ap-
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prove an application, but the statute would provide a range of permissible benefit-cost comparisons.
Realistically, this Article's proposal has a better chance of being
adopted if both environmentalists and industry recognize potential
benefits from the plan and the need for compromise. It is time to
adopt a statute that will address a broader range of risk issues than
simply carcinogenicity. Furthermore, the Amoco-EPA study demonstrates that it is time to take a more individualized and multimedia oriented approach to pollution control despite the legitimate concerns Professor Latin and others have raised about variances and individualized pollution control.
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